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INTRODUCTION

I

magine a country with a law that mirrors Title VII.1 Suppose that an
employer in that country has put up posters stating that persons of a
certain race “need not apply” for pay increases.2 A worker of that race
requests a pay raise and the employer rejects the request. The worker

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Email: scampos@law.miami.edu. Phone: (305) 284-5899. This Article is a contribution to a symposium on the Globalization of the U.S. Litigation Model held at Brooklyn Law School.
Many thanks to the symposium participants for their comments. This Article also benefited from comments I received from workshop participants at Cardozo, Miami, and American law schools. I want to thank Caroline Bradley, Lester Brickman, Zanita Fenton, Myriam Gilles, Jim Greiner, Pat Gudridge, Steve Halpert, Fred McChesney, Arad Reisberg,
David Rosenberg, Stewart Sterk, Markus Wagner, and Adam Zimmerman for their helpful comments on previous drafts. Lauren White and Alyssa Karp provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006).
2. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (contrasting obvious, “first genera-
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then asserts a disparate treatment claim against the employer for a “pattern or practice” of racial discrimination.3
The worker would like to bring a class action because her damages, as
well as the damages for all other affected workers, would be small. But
to proceed as a class action in that country, the worker must first prove
that each member of the class was injured by the alleged discriminatory
practice. The worker must do so even though, to prevail on the claim,
Title VII does not require plaintiffs “to offer evidence that each person
for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s
discriminatory policy.”4 Proving the fact of injury on a classwide basis
may be difficult because some class members may not have deserved a
pay increase in the absence of the discriminatory practice.
The requirement of proof of classwide injury, in effect, prevents the
worker’s class action from being certified, even though the employer’s
conduct is manifestly unlawful, and the class would certainly prevail on
the merits. Given the small claims of each of the class members, the requirement likely prevents all actions from being filed. As it turns out, this
requirement applies to class actions in the United States.
This symposium addresses the spread of the U.S. litigation model to
other jurisdictions, and arguably there is no procedure more American
than the class action.5 Recently, however, other countries have adopted
class actions or similar collective procedures.6 This Article discusses the
tion” forms of discrimination, such as signs stating “Irish need not apply,” from more
complex, “second generation” forms of discrimination, such as unconscious bias).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race”); see
also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (defining disparate treatment pattern-or-practice claims).
4. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360–61 (noting that after a “pattern-or-practice” has been
found to violate Title VII, “a district court must usually conduct additional proceedings
after the liability phase to determine the scope of individual relief”).
5. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic and the Future of
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic] (noting “several exceptional features of the U.S. civil
justice system,” including “class actions”); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation under
Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Actions, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 401, 401 (2002) (“The class action is a uniquely American procedural device.”).
6. Manuel A. Gomez, Collective Redress in Latin America: The Regulation of Class
Actions and Other Forms of Aggregate and Group Litigation for the Protection of Consumer Rights, in L’ART. 140 BIS DEL CODICE DEL CONSUMO: L’AZIONE DI CLASSE 265
(Lorenzo Mezzasoma & Francesco Rizzo eds., 2011) (It.) (discussing class actions and
similar procedures in Latin America); Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic, supra note 5, at 4 (noting recent implementation of procedures “within the broad
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merits of the class action both here and abroad, but takes an American
focus. It examines a recent requirement of U.S. class action doctrine illustrated by the hypothetical above—proof of classwide injury. The Article argues that the requirement reveals misunderstandings about the class
action. It then uses these misunderstandings to suggest factors that both
the United States and other jurisdictions should consider in implementing
class actions or similar procedures.
Federal courts in the United States have recently required proof of
“classwide injury” to certify a class action for damage remedies.7 Proof
of classwide injury is generally understood as proof that the defendant
injured every member of the class.8 Such proof does not have to show the
amount of damages for each plaintiff. Instead, it only has to show that
each plaintiff was in fact injured by the defendant’s alleged unlawful
conduct.9
Proof of classwide injury is referred to in antitrust litigation as proof of
classwide or common “impact,”10 and in securities fraud and Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) fraud litigation as

rubric of ‘aggregate litigation,’” such as “English group litigation orders” and “Italian
class actions”). Many of the contributions to this symposium discuss in great detail collective procedures in different countries.
7. E.g., Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial
of class certification since plaintiffs “cannot prove classwide injury with proof common
to the class”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187
(3d Cir. 2001) (finding that there was no proof of classwide “injury” since “[w]hether a
class member suffered economic loss from a given securities transaction would require
proof of the circumstances surrounding each trade, the available alternative prices, and
the state of mind of each investor at the time the trade was requested”).
8. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”).
9. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 694 (D. Minn. 1995) (“[T]he issue
in the common impact analysis is the fact, not the amount, of injury.”).
10. E.g., Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (“Importantly, individual injury (also
known as antitrust impact) is an element of the cause of action; to prevail on the merits,
every class member must prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the alleged
violation.” (citing Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977))); In re
New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The
real dispute revolved around whether common evidence could be used to prove the impact of the alleged conspiracy on U.S. consumers (‘common impact’).”); see also id. at
19 n.18 (noting that “[t]he element of injury in the antitrust context is often referred to as
‘impact’ or ‘fact of damage,’” (quoting Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309,
317 n.18 (5th Cir. 1978))).
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classwide proof of “transaction causation.”11 Courts have similarly required proof of classwide “specific causation” in mass tort cases,12 as
well as proof of the common “glue” that injured the plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.13 In all contexts proof of classwide injury
is referred to as common proof of the “fact” of injury.14
Courts generally require proof of classwide injury to satisfy the “predominance” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3),
which requires plaintiffs seeking to certify a class to show that “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.”15 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes,16 decided this past term, the Supreme Court suggested that
“significant proof” of classwide injury may be required to satisfy the
“commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), which only requires a
showing that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”17

11. E.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Newton, 259 F.3d at 172 (noting, in the context of civil RICO fraud litigation, that “[r]eliance,
or transaction causation, establishes that but for the fraudulent misrepresentation, the
investor would not have purchased or sold the security” in securities fraud litigation). But
see Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (holding that plaintiffs
are not required to prove reliance to assert a civil RICO claim, but still requiring a showing of proximate cause).
12. E.g., In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 462 (E.D. La. 2006)
(finding a lack of predominance despite common issues of general causation, since “each
individual plaintiff must meet his or her own burden of medical causation” (quoting
Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006))). Cf. Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (finding no predominance in settlement class action involving asbestos claims “given the greater number of questions peculiar to the several categories of class members,” including injury).
13. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).
14. E.g., New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (noting that “[i]n antitrust class actions,
common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust violation and the fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof”).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 20 (requiring
“common proof” of “antitrust impact” to satisfy the predominance requirement). Some
courts also require proof of classwide injury to satisfy the “superiority” requirement of
Rule 23(b)(3), although here I will focus on the predominance requirement. FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(3) (requiring, for purposes of class certification, a showing “that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); Newton, 259 F.3d at 192 (“Because injury determinations must be made on an individual basis in this case, adjudicating the claims as a class will not reduce litigation or
save scarce judicial resources. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs fail to satisfy the
superiority standard.”).
16. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2545 (holding that the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) requires “significant proof that an employer
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Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which defines a residual category that mainly applies to class actions seeking monetary remedies, Rule 23(a)(2) is a prerequisite for all class actions.18
This Article examines proof of classwide injury as a requirement for
certification of a class action. Although the requirement has not attracted
much scholarly attention, most scholars, such as the late Richard Nagareda, have concluded that proof of classwide injury should be a prerequisite for class certification.19 In fact, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart
quoted a seminal article by Nagareda to support its view that the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) not only requires “common
questions,” but proof of “common answers” as to injury:
What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.20

The Wal-Mart Court did not find sufficient proof of “common answers”
because the plaintiffs, all female employees of Wal-Mart, challenged the
thousands of allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion decisions made
operated under a general policy of discrimination” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982))).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule
23(a) is satisfied and” the proposed class action fits into one of the categories defined
under Rule 23(b)).
19. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98–109 (2009) [hereinafter Nagareda, Class Certification]; see also
Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 149, 149–55 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Common Answers]. Some scholars have
not addressed the issue of classwide injury but have implied such a requirement in arguing that the predominance requirement requires a finding that the cases can be substantially “resolved” on a common basis. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to
“Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995,
1005–06 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805,
831–32 (1997). The American Law Institute’s PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION has adopted this “resolvability” approach to the predominance requirement,
and has specifically cited Allan Erbsen’s seminal article for support. AM. L. INST. [ALI],
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02(a)(1) cmt. a (2010). Other
scholars have required an assessment of the merits prior to class certification, which
would entail a finding of classwide injury. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1253–54 (2002); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Class Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–
6 (2001).
20. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note
19, at 132).
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by store and regional managers at Wal-Mart’s many stores. The Court
concluded that “[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for all
those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of
all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to
the crucial question why was I disfavored.”21
This Article argues that the proof of classwide injury requirement arises from three fallacies about the class action. The first fallacy is that class
actions require a court to resolve all issues in one fell swoop. Thus, proof
of classwide injury is necessary because, without such proof, the class
action would unravel into separate trials on the issue of injury.22 But, as
argued below, the class action does not require an all-at-once determination of the merits because the class action is not primarily an all-at-once
trial device but a trust device. The function of the class action is to assign
dispositive control over the plaintiffs’ claims to a third party, class counsel, for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It does so to allow the class attorney
to make common investments, which, because of economies of scale,
lowers the average costs for each plaintiff. The trust function of the class
action is essential for litigation involving small claims because without it
no plaintiff would have incentive to bring suit. More importantly, the
trust function of the class action does not entail an all-at-once determination of the merits. A class action can incorporate multiple trials of the
issues as long as the class attorney can make common investments for
the class.
The second fallacy is that the class action is an extraordinary remedy
that, like a preliminary injunction, requires the plaintiffs to show a likelihood of success on the merits.23 In In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian
Export Antitrust Litigation,24 for example, the court required proof of
21. Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original).
22. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187
(3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that, in the absence of proof of classwide impact, proving
injury on an individual basis would be a “Herculean task,” which “counsels against finding predominance”); see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132
(“What matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”); Wal-Mart, 131
S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 19, at 132) (same); Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1025 (proposing a “finality principle” for the predominance requirement that provides that “a certified class action seeking damages should eventually
result in a judgment resolving the claims of all class members”).
23. E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (noting that
“[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed
on the merits,” among other things.).
24. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.
2008).
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classwide injury in part to test the “novel and complex” theory supporting the plaintiffs’ claims.25 Other circuits have required merits determinations to justify granting the “extraordinary leverage” the plaintiffs gain
from the class action, which can create undue pressure for the defendant
to settle.26 But permitting a court to preview the merits before certifying
the class action is at odds with the trust function of the class action. The
trust function of the class action is designed to equalize the stakes between the plaintiffs and the defendant because the defendant can automatically exploit economies of scale to invest in common issues.27 Accordingly, the class action corrects a structural bias the defendants have
in developing the merits. To avoid this bias, class certification should be
awarded before any merits determination, not after.
The third fallacy is that, in the absence of proof of classwide injury,
individual trials are required to accurately determine each individual
plaintiff’s injury, and thus prevent uninjured plaintiffs from recovering.
Setting aside the all-at-once fallacy, this individualist fallacy suggests
that individual trials are always better than classwide trials to determine
individual issues. However, and as suggested by the hypothetical above,
the lack of proof of classwide injury arises mainly from uncertainty as to
the counterfactual world. Whether a plaintiff has suffered damage depends on how he or she would have fared in the absence of the alleged
unlawful conduct. As argued below, proving the counterfactual may involve evidence that is common to some or all of the members of the
class. Moreover, many other areas of the law express no concern for uninjured plaintiffs recovering. Most importantly, the deterrence function
of the litigation does not require any improved accuracy that may result
from individualized hearings. As discussed below, the deterrence function only requires an assessment of the damage at the class level, not the
individual level, leaving distributional accuracy a matter of secondary
importance.

25. Id. at 26–28 (concluding that a searching inquiry as to classwide impact is necessary since “the granting of class status ‘raises the stakes of litigation so substantially that
the defendant likely will feel irresistible pressure to settle’” (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000))).
26. Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267
(5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179
(2011).
27. This is one of the great insights of David Rosenberg’s work on mass tort litigation. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mass Tort
Class Actions]; see also Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1059, 1074–76 (2012) (discussing the problem of asymmetric stakes).
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After correcting these fallacies, the Article concludes that proof of
classwide injury should not be required to certify a class. Instead, a class
action should be certified if, along with the other prerequisites of Rule
23, the class shares common questions of liability, not common answers
of injury. Accordingly, the trend of requiring proof of classwide injury,
most strikingly seen in the Wal-Mart decision and its interpretation of the
commonality requirement, should reverse course. Otherwise, to insist on
such barriers to class certification would “impair the deterrent effect of
the sanctions which underlie much contemporary law.”28
The Article further argues against adopting the class action as a common answer in other jurisdictions. As discussed below, clarifying the
function of the class action in the U.S. context suggests a number of factors other jurisdictions should consider in importing the class action device. This is not to say that the class action can only work in the United
States. Instead, the goal of the Article is to ensure that other jurisdictions
learn from the United States’ mistakes.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses in more detail the requirement of proof of classwide injury. Part II then discusses each of the
three fallacies of class actions reflected by the requirement of proof of
classwide injury: (1) the all-at-once fallacy, (2) the extraordinary remedy
fallacy, and (3) the individualist fallacy. The Article concludes by arguing that common questions, not common answers, should be the standard
for class certification, both in the United States and abroad.
I. PROVING CLASSWIDE INJURY
Before discussing the requirement of proof of classwide injury, it is
worth discussing the class action law that applies. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 governs federal class actions.29 Rule 23 requires a proposed
class action to satisfy four prerequisites defined under subsection (a) and
fit within one of three categories defined under subsection (b).30 The four
requirements are that “(1) the class is [sufficiently] numerous” (the “numerosity” requirement); “(2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class” (the “commonality” requirement); “(3) . . . the representa28. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (noting that Rule 23 governs all federal class actions).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b); see also Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (“‘[a] class
action may be maintained’ if two conditions are met: the suit must satisfy the criteria set
forth in subdivision (a) . . . and it also must fit into one of the three categories described
in subdivision (b).” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)).
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tive parties are typical” (the “typicality” requirement); and “(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect” the class (the “adequacy of representation” requirement).31
Rule 23(b)(3) defines a residual category of class actions which applies
generally to litigation involving monetary remedies.32 Rule 23(b)(3)
permits a class action only if common questions “predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members” (the “predominance” requirement) and the “class action is superior to other available methods”
(the “superiority” requirement).33
Proving classwide injury primarily implicates the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). Courts have concluded that a failure to show
that every class member was injured would necessarily result in individualized determinations of injury, and such “individual issues . . . would .
. . overwhelm[] the common ones.”34
In New Motor Vehicles, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that an unlawful horizontal conspiracy among car manufacturers restricted the flow
of Canadian cars into the U.S. market.35 The restriction allegedly raised
the negotiating range—the lower “dealer invoice price” and the higher
“Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (“MSRP”)”—for new U.S.
cars.36 The plaintiffs’ experts relied on what the First Circuit considered
a “novel and complex theory” to show an increase in the negotiating
range caused by the alleged conspiracy.37
The district court certified a class of indirect purchasers harmed by the
alleged conspiracy under various state antitrust laws, but the First Circuit
vacated the certification order. Among other things, First Circuit expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs could prove that all members of the
class paid higher prices, because the class contained both “hard bargain-

31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
32. See Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39
F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule 23(b)(3) category); Benjamin Kaplan,
A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (noting that the thennewly created Rule 23(b)(3) category for damage class actions is the “most adventuresome of the new types”).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
34. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
35. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
2008).
36. Id. at 10. The reason for this range is that, until recently, federal antitrust law
considered vertical price-fixing per se unlawful. Leegin Creative Leather Products v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (holding that vertical price-fixing is only subject to
rule of reason review).
37. See New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 26.
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ers” and “poor negotiators.”38 The court noted that some of the poor negotiators may have avoided an injury because they paid the same or less
in the actual world, as compared to world that would have existed but for
the alleged antitrust violation (the “but-for” world).39 Given this variance
among the class members, the First Circuit concluded that issues of law
or fact common to the class did not “predominate.”40
The lack of predominance in New Motor Vehicles was caused, in part,
by the variation among the class members. But the actual variation
among the class members was not the primary cause of the difficulty in
proving classwide injury. After all, if the plaintiffs could determine who
the poor negotiators were who suffered no injury, they would have excluded them from the class. Instead, the primary cause is the potential
variation of the plaintiffs, which arises from uncertainty as to who should
be excluded. The plaintiffs in New Motor Vehicles had yet to propose a
method of determining who the poor negotiators who suffered no injury
were,41 or at least had not proven that there were no such poor negotiators.42
The uncertainty as to whether each plaintiff was injured is itself caused
by the uncertainty of the plaintiffs’ positions in the but-for, or counterfactual, world. In New Motor Vehicles a potential plaintiff could negotiate over the price, and thus could choose to accept the higher, MSRP
price, bargain to the dealers’ invoice price, or bargain somewhere in between. The poor negotiators may have been stuck paying the MSRP in
both worlds, suffering no loss. However, because no one can know what
would have happened in the but-for world, no one can determine if any
poor negotiator would have paid the MSRP in the absence of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct.
The ability to negotiate, while sufficient, is not necessary to create the
uncertainty in the counterfactual world that prevents common proof of
injury. In McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co.,43 for example, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant tobacco companies engaged in a
scheme to fraudulently market “light” cigarettes as healthier, despite
their knowledge that light cigarettes can expose the smoker to the same

38. Id. at 29.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 29–30.
41. Id. at 28 (noting that plaintiffs’ expert had not devised a model for determining
injury and damages).
42. Id. at 29 (providing no proof that “the entire negotiating range” was greater in the
actual world as compared to the but-for world).
43. 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008).
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amount of nicotine through compensation.44 The facts concerning the
defendant’s marketing scheme and knowledge were largely undisputed.45
The district court certified a class of light cigarette purchasers harmed by
the scheme, with potential damages running “billions of dollars.”46 The
district court recognized that the plaintiffs’ civil RICO claims required
proof of reliance on the fraud, which may raise individual issues, but
concluded that the plaintiffs’ proffered methodologies for determining
reliance were sufficient.47
The Second Circuit disagreed. It noted that the civil RICO statute,48
which served as the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims, required a showing of
“transaction or ‘but-for’ causation.”49 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
concluded that the proposed class had to show that each plaintiff “relied
on the defendant’s misrepresentation.”50 However, the Second Circuit
concluded that transaction causation could not be proven on a classwide
basis, because
[i]ndividualized proof is needed to overcome the possibility that a
member of the purported class purchased Lights for some reason other
than the belief that Lights were a healthier alternative—for example, if
a Lights smoker was unaware of that representation, preferred the taste
of Lights, or chose Lights as an expression of personal style.51

The Second Circuit cited a recent Ninth Circuit case, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.,52 involving alleged fraudulent representations made
44. Id. at 220.
45. In related litigation, a district court found “overwhelming evidence” that the defendants’ intentionally used deceptive brand descriptors to market light cigarettes. See
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2006).
46. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215.
47. Id. at 1044–46.
48. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act provides,
among other things, that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of [RICO’s substantive provisions] may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). The Second Circuit noted that the “by
reason of” language in the statute requires a showing “that the defendant’s violation not
only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 222 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)). Since then, the Supreme Court has held that proof of reliance by the plaintiffs is
not necessary. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 645–59 (2008)
(holding that plaintiffs are not required to prove reliance to assert a civil RICO claim, but
still requiring a showing of proximate cause).
49. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 222.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 223.
52. 379 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2004).
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concerning video poker and electronic slot machines.53 There, the Ninth
Circuit found no predominance because the plaintiffs could not prove
reliance on a common basis. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[g]amblers do
not share a common universe of knowledge and expectations—one motivation does not ‘fit all.’”54
Unlike in New Motor Vehicles, the plaintiffs in both McLaughlin and
Poulos did not negotiate over prices. Nevertheless, the same counterfactual uncertainty arose in both contexts because of the discretion the purchasers could exercise in whether to purchase at all. As noted in
McLaughlin, a cigarette purchaser may purchase light cigarettes for lifestyle reasons—she enjoys the flavor or thinks that “smoking Lights [is]
‘cool.’”55 Such “lifestyle” purchasers would not have suffered injury because they would have purchased light cigarettes even in the absence of
the fraud. Likewise, video poker players would not be injured if they
would have gambled in the absence of the fraudulent representations.
Because the plaintiffs in both cases could not ascertain the true motivation for all counterfactual purchase decisions, they could not prove that
all purchasers in the class were in fact injured.
The above three cases suggest that the difficulty in proving classwide
injury arises mainly from the discretion a plaintiff can exercise. In New
Motor Vehicles, the plaintiffs could exercise discretion in negotiating
prices and thus avoid (or not avoid) injury. Likewise, in McLaughlin, the
plaintiffs could exercise discretion and also avoid (or not avoid) injury in
choosing to purchase the cigarettes at all. 56
But consider, by way of contrast, Klay v. Humana, Inc.,57 in which the
plaintiffs, all doctors, alleged civil RICO claims that major health
maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) “conspired with each other to program their computer systems to systematically underpay physicians for
their services,” and fraudulently misrepresented their reimbursement
practices to the plaintiffs.58 The HMOs argued that the doctors could not
satisfy predominance because, as in McLaughlin, “each individual plain-

53. Id. at 659–60; McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 225 (discussing Poulos).
54. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 665.
55. McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 225.
56. Indeed, the discretion that a party can exercise to avoid an injury, such as by purchasing or not purchasing a product, is an off-shoot of the Coase Theorem, which posits
that in the absence of transaction costs, parties can bargain to the most efficient allocation
of legal entitlements. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–
15 (1960) (setting forth the Coase theorem).
57. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).
58. Id. at 1246.
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tiff must specifically show that he, personally, relied on the misstatements at issue.”59
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. After emphasizing that the existence
of an alleged unlawful conspiracy was itself common to the class, it noted that, while the defendants used a variety of communications to defraud the physicians, “they all conveyed essentially the same message—
that the defendants would honestly pay physicians the amounts to which
they were entitled.”60 The court explained,
[i]t does not strain credulity to conclude that each plaintiff, in entering
into contracts with the defendants, relied upon the defendants’ representations and assumed they would be paid the amounts they were due.
A jury could quite reasonably infer that guarantees concerning physician pay—the very consideration upon which those agreements are
based—go to the heart of these agreements, and that doctors based their
assent upon them.61

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that each plaintiff’s reliance
could be proven through common evidence, in this case “through legitimate inferences based on the nature of the alleged misrepresentations at
issue.”62
Klay contains the same discretionary conduct found in cases such as
New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin. The doctors in Klay exercised discretion in entering contracts with HMOs over reimbursement practices,
similar to the exercise of discretion in negotiating the price of a car or
buying a light cigarette. But the same difficulty in proving classwide injury does not arise because the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the discretionary conduct in Klay did not lead to counterfactual uncertainty as
to the fact of injury. In both New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin, the
ability to exercise discretion created uncertainty as to the counterfactual
baseline. Would a poor negotiator have done any better without the alleged antitrust violation? Would a plaintiff have bought a light cigarette
anyway for “lifestyle” reasons?
By contrast, the Klay court concluded that the plaintiffs’ discretion did
not create similar counterfactual uncertainty. Unlike in McLaughlin, it
was difficult for the Klay court to imagine a counterfactual where the
doctors would have assented to the exact same contract terms with full

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
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knowledge of the defendants’ real reimbursement practices.63 The analogue in New Motor Vehicles would be proof that the entire negotiating
range increased, leaving no doubt that everyone was injured.64
As shown by Klay, the availability of discretion only causes counterfactual uncertainty if it creates an uncertain link in the causal chain that
leads to counterfactual uncertainty as a whole. Indeed, the state of mind
of a party is notoriously a black box in the absence of overt manifestations of it. Consequently, the difficulty of proving classwide injury extends to situations where there are similar uncertain links in the causal
chain that lead to counterfactual uncertainty.
For example, in consumer fraud litigation involving the seizure drug
Neurontin, the plaintiffs alleged a widespread scheme to fraudulently
induce doctors to prescribe Neurontin to their patients for off-label use as
a general pain reliever, even though Neurontin had no efficacy in treating
pain.65 The plaintiffs showed that, since the start of the alleged fraudulent
marketing scheme, the number of prescriptions of Neurontin for pain
relief and similar off-label indications skyrocketed.66
The district court, however, found no predominance of common issues
because, among other things, the court found that the plaintiffs could not
prove classwide injury.67 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ proposed
econometric models for classwide injury could not “identify which prescribing physicians were exposed to defendants’ fraudulent statements.”
Thus, the court could not “determine which consumer class members’
Neurontin prescriptions were caused by defendants’ alleged fraud,” as
opposed to those prescriptions “which would have occurred even in the
absence of the fraud.”68 As the district court correctly pointed out, only
the class members whose prescriptions were caused by the fraud “had a
cognizable injury.”69

63. As an aside, the contrast presented here is not meant to endorse the Klay court’s
conclusion that it was reasonable to infer that every doctor relied upon the HMO’s contract provisions. In fact, it is troubling that the Klay court would give the benefit of the
doubt to doctors in inferring classwide injury but other courts would not do so for less
sympathetic (and probably lower-income) smokers and gamblers.
64. See, e.g., Natchitoches Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 262 F.R.D. 58,
69 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding predominance satisfied since plaintiffs showed that the “‘entire negotiating range’ . . . was higher than the prices in the but-for world”).
65. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D. Mass.
2007).
66. Id. at 96–103 (providing charts and data demonstrating such changes).
67. Id. at 110–12.
68. Id. at 111–12 (emphasis in original).
69. Id.
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In Neurontin the uncertain link in the causal chain was not the discretion of the plaintiffs, but the discretion of a third party—a doctor—to
prescribe the drug. Indeed, as suggested in the Wal-Mart case, it can also
arise from the discretion of the defendant. Would the defendant (or, as in
Wal-Mart, one of its subordinates) have discriminated against the plaintiff is she were male?70
Similar uncertain links in the causal chain arose in products liability
litigation involving the drug Vioxx.71 There, the plaintiffs provided epidemiological evidence demonstrating that Vioxx increased the risk of
heart attacks and strokes. Nevertheless, the district court denied class
certification. The district court recognized that “the majority of plaintiffs
in this case allegedly suffered a heart attack or stroke as a result of ingesting Vioxx.”72 However, as in Neurontin, the court noted that individual issues predominated as to, among other issues, “whether the plaintiffs’ physicians would still have prescribed Vioxx had stronger warnings
been given.”73 Moreover, the court concluded that it would have to engage in “the highly individualized inquiry of whether Vioxx specifically
caused the injury alleged by each plaintiff in light of his or her medical
history, family history, and other risk factors, and the use of the drug.”74
In Vioxx, the counterfactual uncertainty did not arise exclusively from
the discretion of the plaintiffs or third parties, but from biological uncertainties in the causal chain. It is unclear whether, given individual “risk
factors,” a particular plaintiff would have suffered a heart attack or stroke
in the counterfactual world of not taking Vioxx. Indeed, because issues
of specific causation always arise in cases involving pharmaceuticals, the
court noted that “courts have almost invariably found that common questions of fact do not predominate in pharmaceutical drug cases.”75
II. THREE CLASS ACTION FALLACIES
The previous Part discussed the difficulty of proving classwide injury
in different substantive areas of the law. It showed that the difficulty in
proving classwide injury arises from links in the causal chain that lead to
uncertainty as to what would have happened had the alleged legal viola70. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); see also D. James
Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 559–65 (2008)
(noting that the central causation issue in employment discrimination cases is whether the
decision would have been different if the gender or race was different).
71. In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 452 (E.D. La. 2006).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 461.
74. Id. at 462.
75. Id. at 461.
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tion not occurred. It is this counterfactual uncertainty that prevents plaintiffs from showing that every plaintiff in the class was injured because of
the defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct.
This Part discusses the premises that underlie the requirement of proof
of classwide injury. It argues that the requirement arises from three fallacies about the class action: (A) the all-at-once fallacy, (B) the extraordinary remedy fallacy, and (C) the individualist fallacy.
A. The All-at-Once Fallacy
As noted above, the primary source of the requirement of proof of
classwide injury is the predominance requirement, which requires that
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members.”76 The concern is that
in the absence of proof of classwide injury, individual issues of injury
would “overwhelm” any common issues.77 As put by the Third Circuit in
a securities fraud case involving allegedly fraudulent representations that
brokers made trades at the “best reasonably available price”:
Whether a class member suffered economic loss from a given securities
transaction would require proof of the circumstances surrounding each
trade, the available alternative prices, and the state of mind of each investor at the time the trade was requested.78

The Third Circuit concluded that “[t]his Herculean task, involving hundreds of millions of transactions, counsels against finding predominance.”79
It is easy to miss the premise of the seemingly common-sense observation that, in the absence of common proof of injury, the court will face
the “Herculean” task of determining injury on an individual basis. The
premise is that the class action requires an all-at-once assessment of the
issues. As put by the late Richard Nagareda, “class certification does not
turn upon the mere raising of common questions by way of expert submissions or any form of evidence. Class certification instead turns on the
capacity of a unitary proceeding to yield common answers.”80

76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
77. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
78. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187 (3d
Cir. 2001).
79. Id.
80. Nagareda, Common Answers, supra note 19, at 154 (emphasis added); see also
Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132) (same).
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Consider, for example, General Telephone Company of the Southwest
v. Falcon,81 a case involving a Mexican-American plaintiff who was allegedly denied a promotion on the basis of his race.82 In Falcon, the
plaintiff sought to certify a class of all Mexican-Americans injured by
any of the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory employment practices,
even though the plaintiff himself was only affected by the defendant’s
promotion practices. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was permitted to certify a
class due to the across-the-board rule then followed by the Fifth Circuit,
which permitted an alleged victim of racial discrimination to bring suit
on behalf of all similarly situated victims. The Fifth Circuit premised the
across-the-board rule on the fact that “racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination.”83 As the case proceeded, the only class claim
that survived was a disparate impact claim concerning the defendant’s
hiring practices, which had little do to with the plaintiff’s own case of
disparate treatment in his promotion.84
The Supreme Court vacated class certification largely because the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the “typicality” and “commonality” requirements.85 The Court noted that
[c]lass relief is “peculiarly appropriate” when the “issues involved are
common to the class as a whole” and when they “turn on questions of
law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class.” For in
such cases, “the class-action device saves the resources of both the
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every
[class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule
23.”86

But the Court concluded that the complaint “provided an insufficient basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in
promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.”87
The premise of Falcon, that the function of the class action is to determine all issues “in an economical fashion under Rule 23,” is pervasive.88
81. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
82. Id. at 149.
83. Id. at 157 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s “across-the-board rule”).
84. Id. at 152.
85. Id. at 158. The Court noted in passing that “[t]he commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge,” which also “tend to merge with the adequacyof-representation requirement.” Id. at 157 n.13.
86. Id. at 155 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).
87. Id. at 158.
88. Califano, 442 U.S. at 701.
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Consider Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, which the Court decided this
past term.89 In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs alleged a disparate treatment
claim against Wal-Mart that did not center on any one specific pay or
promotion policy, but the lack of one.90 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s lack of criteria for such decisions, coupled
with a uniform corporate culture, led to excessive subjectivity that
caused discriminatory pay and promotion decisions by regional and store
managers against over a million of Wal-Mart’s female employees.91
The plaintiffs emphasized that the core issue of whether the policy of
excessive subjectivity supports an inference of discriminatory intent is
common to the class.92 The Court, however, noted that the commonality
of discriminatory intent was beside the point, since, quoting Nagareda,
[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common
“questions”—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of
the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have
the potential to impede the generation of common answers.93

The Court concluded that the plaintiffs sought “to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once.”94 But, according to the Court,
“[w]ithout some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions
together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class
members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial
question why was I disfavored.”95
The plaintiffs in both Falcon and Wal-Mart sought to certify a class
under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not require a finding of predominance.96
Both cases turned on the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2),97

89. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
90. Id. at 2547–48.
91. Id. at 2548.
92. Id.
93. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19,
at 132).
94. Id. at 2552 (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing that a class action may be certified if,
along with satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), the plaintiff shows that “the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole”).
97. Falcon also concerned the “typicality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), but noted
that “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.” Gen.
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
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and as the Court has recognized in other contexts, the “predominance
criterion is [a] far more demanding” requirement than commonality.98
Nevertheless, the Court’s insistence on “common answers” has as its
source the predominance requirement. This is particularly true in WalMart, where the very text quoted by the Court is a criticism by Nagareda
of the predominance requirement’s focus on common questions. In Nagareda’s view, the predominance requirement should focus on “dissimilarities,” not “similarities,” since “[h]eaps of similarities do not overcome dissimilarities that would prevent common resolution.”99 Other
scholars, most notably Allan Erbsen, have similarly stressed the importance of “[s]imilarity among claims” since it “facilitates crafting a
judgment that specifies the rights of all class members.”100 In contrast,
according to Erbsen, “dissimilarity may necessitate fact-intensive caseby-case inquiries into the propriety of judgment that would make class
litigation difficult, if not impossible.”101 Erbsen has gone so far as to
suggest that “it is time to excise ‘predominance’ from the vernacular of
class action discourse and replace it with a more practical ‘resolvability’
approach.”102
The class action, however, does not require “a classwide proceeding to
generate common answers”103 so that “a judgment . . . specifies the rights
of all class members.”104 In fact, if that were the case, then no antitrust,
securities fraud, or employment discrimination class action would ever
be certified. This is because individual issues of damages are always present in cases involving damage remedies, and thus always require the
very case-by-case inquiries that, as suggested by Falcon and Wal-Mart,
would preclude class certification. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that
“individual damage questions do not preclude a Rule 23(b)(3) class action when the issue of liability is common to the class.”105
98. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997).
99. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S.
Ct. at 2556 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “Professor Nagareda, whose ‘dissimilarities’ inquiry the Court endorses, developed his position
in the context of Rule 23(b)(3)”).
100. Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1027.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1088.
103. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Nagareda,
Class Certification, supra note 19, at 132).
104. Erbsen, supra note 19, at 1027.
105. 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 24:124 (4th ed. 2002) (quoted by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008)) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS]; see also In
re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28 (1st Cir. 2008)
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Courts typically address the problem of individual damage issues by,
in essence, denying that the class action requires a “classwide proceeding
to generate common answers” to all issues.106 One common solution is
bifurcation, or dividing the class action into a single trial on common
issues of liability, followed by individual trials on damages. This approach, in fact, was commonly used in employment discrimination cases
prior to Wal-Mart,107 and is currently used in antitrust108 and civil RICO
cases.109
Another approach, typically taken in the securities fraud and antitrust
contexts, is to paper over individual issues by viewing the determination
of damages as “a mechanical task involving the administration of a formula.”110 The use of such formulas to determine damages may result in
an inaccurate assessment of individual damages, but courts have not required precision “where such a formula may be used to eliminate the

(“Predominance is not defeated by individual damages questions as long as liability is
still subject to common proof.”); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625
(1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws.”).
106. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note
19, at 132).
107. See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168–69 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that district court abused its discretion in “denying partial certification” of a class as to liability only, with individual issues of damages determined separately); see also 8 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 24:124 (“The majority
of courts have held the bifurcation of class liability and relief phases of Title VII suits to
be an appropriate means of litigating employment discrimination claims.”). In fact, Rule
23 permits certification as to common issues. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”).
However, Wal-Mart puts the use of bifurcation in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in serious
doubt. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (rejecting such bifurcation).
108. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 28 (noting that “the class action can be
limited to the question of liability, leaving damages for later individualized determinations”); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001)
(Sotomayor, J.), overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.,
471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In the event that the district court does find conflicts [as to
damage calculation] . . . there are a variety of devices available to resolve the problem
[including] . . . the possibilities of bifurcating liability and damage trials.”).
109. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Posner, J.) (citing Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 141) (affirming RICO class certification and
suggesting procedural mechanisms available at a later stage for individual issues such as
damages and bifurcation).
110. 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 22:65; see also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[S]hould the class prevail the amount of price
inflation during the period can be charted and the process of computing individual damages will be virtually a mechanical task.”).
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need for individual proof of damages and thus serve the ends of both justice and judicial economy.”111
But why can a court permit bifurcation or imprecision for the amount
of damages, but-for not the fact of damages? After all, one could, in theory,112 define an inchoate class of individuals and determine both the fact
and amount of damages during an individual issue phase. One reason
why courts distinguish between the fact of damage and the amount of
damages arises out of Article III concerns.113 Although the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue, it has recognized that a class member
who cannot show injury-in-fact may lack Article III standing to sue.114

111. 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 18:53 (noting that “the court
should not reject” class actions in the antitrust context due to inaccurate methods of assessing and distributing damages).
112. I say “in theory” because, along with proof of classwide injury, courts also require plaintiffs to identify all class members, and cite “the bedrock principle that members of a class must be identifiable.” In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244
F.R.D. 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2007); see also Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305,
309 (2010) (criticizing the requirement of “ascertainability” in small claims class actions). I criticize this ascertainability requirement below. See infra Part II.C.2.
113. Another reason for the insistence on classwide proof of injury arises out of due
process concerns. For example, the Second Circuit in McLaughlin, quoting Newton, noted that since “‘actual injury cannot be presumed, . . . defendants have the right to raise
individual defenses against each class member.’” McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522
F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001)) (rejecting use of fluid recovery procedures for
determining and distributing damages). Similarly, in Wal-Mart, the Court rejected the use
of sampling to determine damages, concluding that such a “Trial by Formula” is inappropriate because “Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). Thus, if plaintiffs
cannot establish the fact of injury on a common basis, courts conclude that the individual
rights of the parties, particularly the defendants, must be protected. I discuss these due
process concerns in more detail in a separate article. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1088–
1121 (discussing and criticizing due process for procedural rights such as individual defenses). Nevertheless, it should be noted that while the use of imprecise procedures for
assessing damages may undermine a defendant’s individual defenses, bifurcation keeps
intact a defendant’s right to assert individual’s defenses.
114. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (acknowledging, but not deciding, issue of whether exposure-only claimants have standing to sue);
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (same); see also Diane Wood
Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV.
459, 503–04 (discussing standing and mootness issues). The Court recently denied certiorari over the issue of standing in class actions. See Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655
F.3d 1013, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1970 (U.S. 2012) (holding that
proof of classwide injury is not necessary for the class to have standing for Article III
purposes).
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This standing issue is of particular relevance because it strikes at the
core of the function of the class action. Requiring each class member to
demonstrate an injury-in-fact suggests that the class action is a “joinder”
device in which the class action merely aggregates disparate plaintiffs
together in one suit.115 In fact, Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Wal-Mart, has suggested that the class action is a joinder device in other settings.116 If so, then the class action would require proof
of classwide injury to get off the ground for Article III purposes.
One could also view the class action as a “representation” device, in
which the only party for purposes of the litigation is the class representative.117 Understood in this way, each of the absent class members would
not have to independently establish standing so long as the representative
did so. In fact, as Judge Diane Wood has argued previously, the existing
case law supports the “representational” view over the “joinder” view,
and the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation (of which Richard Nagareda was a reporter) has explicitly endorsed the “representational” view.118
However, the class action is neither a “joinder” device nor a “representational” device. Instead, the class action is a trust device, which becomes apparent once one examines why class actions are preferable in
small claims litigation like the antitrust, securities fraud, civil RICO, and
employment discrimination cases discussed thus far.119 The Supreme
Court noted in Amchem Products v. Windsor,120 a mass tort case, that:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry po-

115. See Hutchinson, supra note 114, at 459–60 (discussing class actions as a “joinder” device).
116. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1443 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (describing Rule 23 as only “allowing multiple claims (and
claims by or against multiple parties) to be litigated together.”).
117. Hutchinson, supra note 114, at 503–06 (discussing historical vacillation between
viewing class actions as “joinder” and as “representational” devices, but arguing in favor
of the “representational” view).
118. See ALI, supra note 19, § 1.01 cmt. c.
119. In what follows I summarize the argument that the class action is a de facto
“trust” device. For a more extended argument in favor of the trust function of the class
action, see Campos, supra note 27, at 9. I also discuss the class action trust function and
the issue of Article III standing in much more detail in a separate article. See Sergio J.
Campos, The Trust Function of the Class Action (June 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
120. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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tential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.121

This rationale for the class action for small claims litigation has been
invoked repeatedly by the Court122 and by scholars.123
It is worth unpacking this rationale. In small claims litigation an individual plaintiff lacks an “incentive . . . to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights” because the stakes are too small.124 It would be irrational for a plaintiff to spend his or her own money, or secure financing,
when the investment would cost more than the expected return. Put more
bluntly by Judge Posner, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”125
The class action solves this problem of insufficient individual incentive
to sue by “aggregat[ing] the paltry potential recoveries” of the plaintiffs.126 The class action collects together the expected recoveries of the
plaintiffs so that the costs of bringing an action, as well as other common
investments, are spread among the plaintiffs. In doing so, the class action
lowers the average per-plaintiff costs of common investments by increasing the scale of the expected recovery. Put another way, the class action
exploits economies of scale to give the plaintiffs incentives both to bring
and to invest in the litigation.127
121. Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.
1997)).
122. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (noting
that “[r]equiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably impede the
prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of small individual claims,
where a large number of claims are required to make it economical to bring suit”); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”).
123. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 2043, 2046 (2010); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 105–06 (2006); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC. L. REV. 709, 710
(2006).
124. Mace, 109 F.3d at 344; Campos, supra note 27, at 1079 & n.79 (quoting Mace).
125. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)
(discussing a civil RICO small claims class action).
126. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344).
127. The source of this insight is David Rosenberg in his work on mass tort litigation.
See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 902–03 (1984). Recent work by Rosenberg clarifying the problem and how a mandatory class action resolves it include David
Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The
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But it is important to be precise about how the class action creates incentives to invest in the suit through economies of scale. As the Amchem
Court noted, the aggregation of expected recoveries makes the individual
actions “something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”128
The “usually an attorney’s” caveat is crucial. The class action is worth an
attorney’s labor, in part because class attorneys are typically assigned a
percentage of the plaintiffs’ aggregate recovery.129 Moreover, under the
common fund doctrine, any investment costs are spread among the class
members, even those plaintiffs who do not collect.130 Accordingly, the
expected return of the class attorney is a function of the plaintiffs’ aggregate net expected recovery. In other words, the class attorney is given a
beneficial interest in the recovery that is consistent with owning the total
net expected recovery of the plaintiffs.131
In addition to an interest in the plaintiffs’ net expected recovery, class
attorneys are given control over the plaintiffs’ claims. This control is exemplified by one of the most controversial aspects of the class action—
the ability of class attorneys to settle the claims of all plaintiffs without
their consent. A settlement requires a judicial hearing on its fairness and
permits individual class members to raise objections to the settlement,
but does not require the consent of the class.132
Many scholars have criticized this aspect of the class action as a taking
of the plaintiffs’ property without their consent.133 Others have suggested
Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002); Rosenberg, Mass Tort
Class Actions, supra note 27; David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass
Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62
IND. L.J. 561 (1987); see also Campos, supra note 27, at 1064 n.19, 1076–79 (discussing
Rosenberg and the function of the class action in allowing the plaintiffs to exploit economies of scale).
128. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344).
129. ALI, supra note 19, § 3.13(a) cmt. b (noting that “most courts and commentators
now believe that the percentage [of the fee] method is superior” to the “lodestar method”).
130. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (permitting a district court
to apportion costs, including attorneys’ fees, against the unclaimed portion of a class
action judgment under the “common-fund doctrine”).
131. Campos, supra note 27, at 1077–78.
132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (permitting a class action to be settled subject to a fairness hearing).
133. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 149–51 (2009); John Bronsteen, Class
Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903, 904–07; John
Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1419–22
(2003).
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mechanisms by which the plaintiffs can still exercise their control (or
autonomy) over their claims in a class action, such as by opting out of
the class134 or through voting mechanisms.135
But the “taking” caused by the class action can be understood as the
transfer of an entitlement to exercise dispositive control over the claims
for the benefit of the class. Thus, this transfer is functionally an assignment of “title” over the claims, which is analogous to the title that trustees own over trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries.136
More importantly, this assignment of title to the class attorney should
not be considered per se137 problematic because the assignment is necessary to make the litigation worth an attorney’s “labor.” Although the
class attorney has a percentage interest in the plaintiffs’ net expected recovery, the attorney will not have a reason to invest in common issues
unless she has dispositive control over the claims, including the power to
sell the claims through settlement. Otherwise, any investments can be
thwarted by the independent actions of the plaintiffs, who can bring suit
separately and deny any share of the recovery to the class attorney.138 If
the class attorney has nothing, he or she has nothing to lose (or win, for
that matter).139
134. ALI, supra note 19, § 2.07 cmt. e.
135. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 921–22 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
370, 376–77 (2000).
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (defining a “trust” as a “fiduciary
relationship” which “subject[s] the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal
with it for the benefit of . . . one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole
trustee.”); Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 278–
80 (2008) (defining, and distinguishing, the “beneficial interest” in a claim from the “legal title” to the claim, and noting that those with only a “legal title” to the claim have
sufficient standing to sue, even if they remit all of the “beneficial interest” to another
party). I have posed this argument before, see Campos, supra note 27, at 1076–79 (discussing the dispositive control the class attorney receives through the class action).
137. I say “per se” because there are, of course, concerns with agency costs, which
have preoccupied class action scholars. See ALI, supra note 19, § 3.13(a) cmt. b. But, as I
have argued previously, these agency concerns can be addressed without requiring the
consent of the class members. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1115–17.
138. For a formal discussion and model of this, see Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle For Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997) (arguing that class attorneys may suboptimally settle claims if they do not have dispositive
control and a sufficient beneficial interest over all of them).
139. The converse is also true, since owning legal title without a beneficial interest
also would not amount to much. Cf. Sprint, 544 U.S. at 300–01 (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether plaintiffs with legal title but no beneficial interest in a claim have
sufficient standing for Article III purposes, since “‘[w]hen you got nothing, you got noth-
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Consequently, the class action cannot be understood as a device that
solves the problem of insufficient stakes in small claims litigation without also being understood as a trust device. Indeed, courts generally recognize that it is not the representative who controls investments, but the
class attorney. This is because the class attorney, “unlike the representative plaintiff[,] receive[s] compensation reflecting any benefits conferred
on the class as a whole,” thus making her “willing to underwrite the
costs.”140 In essence, the class attorney is the “real party in interest,”141
and locating standing among the various plaintiffs is, for the most part, a
fiction to assuage concerns about the Rules Enabling Act.142
More importantly, the trust function of the class action does not entail
an all-at-once determination of any issues. The trust function of the class
action facilitates investment in common issues by providing sufficient
incentive for the class attorney to invest in the case. This trust function,
however, does not require the resolution of all common issues in one fell
swoop. In fact, so long as the class attorney can make common investments and maintain overall control over the claims, a class action can
proceed through completely individual actions. Just like an attorney who
expressly represents all of the plaintiffs in a case, a class attorney could
choose to file individual suits rather than file a class action, while investing in common issues in the background. Indeed, a court could determine

ing to lose’” (quoting BOB DYLAN, Like A Rolling Stone, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965))).
140. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.)
(rejecting district court finding that the class representative was not adequate because he
or she would not bear the total costs of the litigation, noting that “[t]he very feature that
makes class treatment appropriate—small individual stakes and large aggregate ones—
ensures that the representative will be unwilling to vouch for the entire costs. Only a lunatic would do so. A madman is not a good representative of the class!”).
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (providing that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest,” including “a trustee of an express trust”).
142. Specifically, courts have interpreted the assignment of a cause of action as a matter of “substance” that cannot be modified by rules of civil procedure like Rule 23. See 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (prohibiting any rule that “abridge[s], enlarge[s], or modif[ies]
any substantive right”); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485
F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (“Whether a plaintiff is entitled to enforce the asserted right is
determined according to the substantive law.”). Cf. 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1545 (4th ed. 2010)
(concluding that substantive law relating to the assignment of claims is the basis for the
real-party-in-interest rule). I address this concern in a prior work and in a current project
on the Rules Enabling Act. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1117–21; see also Sergio J.
Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(on file with author).
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both common issues and each plaintiff’s damages in individual suits, allowing the common issues to “mature” over time.143
The trust function of the class action shows that the class action can
provide many of the beneficial features of consolidation procedures such
as multidistrict litigation. Scholars have praised the use of multidistrict
litigation as a substitute for class actions because it allows for separate
suits while permitting better coordination among the plaintiffs for common benefit work.144 A class action, however, can mimic these same features. In fact, multidistrict litigation, like the class action, often results in
the assignment of collective control to attorneys, with some scholars going so far as to call such multidistrict litigation “quasi-class actions.”145
B. The Extraordinary Remedy Fallacy
In New Motor Vehicles, the First Circuit found no predominance of
common issues because of the potential variance among the class members’ injuries, which, in the court’s view, would necessitate individualized trials.146 The court added, however, that without a “searching inquiry” of the plaintiffs’ “novel and complex” theory of injury, “many
resources will be wasted setting up a trial that plaintiffs cannot win.”147
Indeed, earlier in the opinion, the First Circuit noted that
[i]nterlocutory appeals from class certification under Rule 23(f) are especially appropriate where the plaintiffs’ theory is novel or where a
doubtful class certification results in financial exposure to defendants
so great as to provide substantial incentives for defendants to settle

143. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 659 (1989) (discussing the benefits of having common issues “mature” through
separate actions); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748–49 (5th Cir.
1996) (same); In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 576, 579 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1997) (same).
144. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class
Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2008); see also Roger Trangsrud,
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 820–22 (1985).
145. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of
Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107,
109–10 (2010) (noting that multi-district litigation in which judges have unfettered discretion to appoint lead counsel are recognized as “quasi-class actions”); see also ALI,
supra note 19, § 1.05 cmt. a (“[A] common structural feature of all aggregate proceedings
[is] the loss of control of litigation by persons whose interests are at issue.”).
146. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26–28 (1st
Cir. 2008).
147. Id. at 26, 29.
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nonmeritorious cases in an effort to avoid both risk of liability and litigation expense.148

The First Circuit is not alone. Nearly all circuits have emphasized “‘[t]he
effect of a class certification in inducing settlement to curtail the risk of
large awards.’”149
One of the strongest examples of this concern can be found in Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom Co.,150 where the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the denial of a securities fraud class action.151 As background, plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions are required to prove
their reliance on the alleged fraudulent statements in buying or selling
their shares.152 Like the reliance requirement in McLaughlin, the reliance
requirement in securities fraud litigation is an individual issue that could
prevent the plaintiffs from satisfying the predominance requirement.153
However, unlike in cases like McLaughlin, the parties can satisfy the
predominance requirement by establishing the “fraud-on-the-market”
presumption, which is a rebuttable presumption that every member of the
class relied on the alleged fraud if the security was traded on an efficient
market.154
148. Id. at 8 (citing Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004); Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000)).
149. Id. (quoting West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Easterbook, J.)); see also Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc.,
487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (“We cannot ignore the in terrorem power of certification.”);
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
class actions may “create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the
part of defendants.” (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259
F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001))); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d
Cir. 2008) (noting that “[p]ossible recoveries [may] run into astronomical amount [and]
generate more leverage and pressure on defendants to settle” (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973))); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007) (noting potential of “in terrorem” suits to induce settlements in the context of antitrust class action).
150. 487 F.3d 261.
151. Id.
152. Specifically, “reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action” based on
fraud because reliance “provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s
misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243
(1988); see also Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (reaffirming that
“reliance” or “transaction causation” is an element of a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim).
153. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 227–30 (noting the difficulty of satisfying the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) in securities fraud class actions given the need to
prove reliance on an individual basis).
154. Id. (discussing the presumption). I discuss the presumption in more detail below.
See infra Part II.C.2. In addition, and as I discuss below, in McLaughlin the Second Cir-
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Prior to Oscar, the Fifth Circuit held that proof of loss causation, or
proof that the alleged fraudulent statement caused a change in the stock
price, was a prerequisite for establishing the fraud-on-the-market presumption for purposes of summary judgment.155 In Oscar, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs had to prove loss causation to obtain certification of a securities fraud class action in the first place.156
This is of particular significance to securities fraud class actions because
loss causation is also an element of a securities fraud claim.157 Thus, requiring the plaintiffs to prove loss causation to establish the fraud-on-themarket presumption at the class certification stage would, in effect, require the plaintiffs to prove the merits of their claims to certify a class.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs did have to prove loss
causation, noting that it could not “ignore the in terrorem power of class
certification.”158 The Oscar court did not stop there. It went on to point
out numerous limitations to the class action caused by amendments to
Rule 23 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, noting that
these changes “recognize that a district court’s certification order often
bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary leverage, and its bite should dictate
the process that precedes it.”159
Scholars have also commented on or criticized the extraordinary leverage a class action bestows upon plaintiffs, which may place undue settlement pressure on defendants.160 In fact, shortly after the passage of the
1966 amendments permitting damage class actions under Rule 23,161 the
great Judge Friendly lambasted the “blackmail settlements” caused by
the class action.162
cuit rejected the use of a similar fraud-on-the-market presumption in civil RICO litigation. See id.; see also McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 224 n.5 (rejecting use of the fraud-on-themarket presumption in civil RICO litigation).
155. Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 662, 665–66 (5th Cir. 2004).
156. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 266.
157. Dura, 544 U.S. at 341.
158. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 267.
159. Id.
160. E.g., Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes are Principally Determined by Lawyers’ Rates of Return,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1780–82 (1994); Peter H. Shuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 958 (1995); see also Bruce Hay &
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 nn.4–6 (2000) (citing the scholarly
literature on “blackmail” class action settlements).
161. See generally Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule 23(b)(3) category).
162. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 118–20 (1973);
see also Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-

780

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 37:3

This concern with the extraordinary leverage of the class action is partially due to the all-at-once fallacy. For support of the view that class
actions put undue pressure on defendants to settle, courts have cited In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.163 There, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the certification of a class action
of claims related to blood allegedly tainted with the HIV virus.164 The
district court proposed certifying a class action to decide common issues
of liability, with the remaining issues decided in individual trials.165
The Seventh Circuit court granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the
district court to vacate the class certification order. In an opinion by
Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the plaintiffs had lost
twelve of thirteen individual actions, and the defendants “are likely to
win most of the remaining ones as well.”166 Since the class could run
well into the thousands, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a writ of
mandamus was warranted given “the sheer magnitude of the risk to
which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or
likely, expose[d]” the defendants.167 According to the court, separate actions reduce this error risk because they provide “a pooling of judgment .
. . of many different tribunals.”168
As argued above,169 the class action does not require an all-at-once
resolution of common issues. Thus, the class action can take advantage
of the pooling of judgment of many trials. In fact, a class action do so by
allowing the plaintiffs, under the direction of the class attorney, to sue
separately in their preferred forums.

trust Suits—the Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1971)
(discussing “blackmail” class actions in the antitrust context, and inspiring Judge Friendly’s views on the topic).
163. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.); see, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[i]n addition to skewing trial outcomes,
class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not” (citing Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298)). Cf. Klay v. Humana,
Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Rhone-Poulenc, but noting that
“[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit”).
164. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294. Rule 23 has since been amended to permit the
interlocutory appeal of class certification orders. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
165. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (permitting issue only class actions).
166. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
167. Id. at 1297 (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 1300.
169. See supra Part II.A; see also Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 1382 (noting
the availability of multiple trials in a class action to reduce error risk in deciding common
issues).
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But the Seventh Circuit echoes a widely shared view that the class action is analogous to extraordinary remedies, such as the preliminary injunction, that should only be awarded based on a likelihood of success on
the merits.170 The writ of mandamus at issue in Rhone-Poulenc is itself a
remedy that is “issued only in extraordinary cases,” and is only awarded
when the challenged order would, among other things, cause “irreparable
harm.”171 The Rhone-Poulenc court concluded that irreparable harm
would result from the class certification order because the plaintiffs’
claims were not likely to be meritorious, yet would likely lead to, among
other things, a “blackmail settlement” that could not be undone by appellate review.172 In fact, some scholars have argued explicitly for a merits
inquiry prior to class certification precisely because of the class action’s
extraordinary ability to significantly increase the leverage of the plaintiffs.173
Many courts follow similar logic in concluding that the class action,
like a preliminary injunction, should only be certified based on a likelihood of success on the merits for the plaintiffs. But they do so somewhat
clandestinely. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,174 a fairly early decision
concerning Rule 23(b)(3), the district court assigned notice costs to the
defendant based on a finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
170. E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (noting that
preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon
a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief”); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (“It frequently is observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” (quoting 11A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995))).
171. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294–95.
172. The court ultimately concluded that the “irreparable injury” here was sufficient
given that, along with the undue settlement pressure that would be created by the class
action, the proposed class action could lead to a reexamination of issues in violation of
the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights. Id. at 1299. But, as I have argued previously,
bifurcation along the lines proposed by the district court in Rhone-Poulenc would not
result in any reexamination of issues. See Campos, supra note 27, at 1073.
173. See Bone & Evans, supra note 19, at 1254; Hazard, supra note 19, at 3–6. Others
have at least noted the potential for class actions to lead to the settlement of nonmeritorious claims, although many disagree as to the precise effect. See Janet Cooper Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 497 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994); Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991); Joel
Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying
Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws:The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994).
174. 417 U.S. 167 (1974).
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the merits.175 The district court did so by explicitly analogizing the class
action to a “preliminary injunction.”176 The Eisen Court, however, vacated the district court’s order because it “f[ound] nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether
it may be maintained as a class action.”177 Thus, under Eisen, a district
court deciding to certify a class action cannot review the merits unless it
has authority to do so under Rule 23.
As it turns out, courts have found a way to review the merits at the
class certification stage by insisting on proof of classwide injury to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). After all, to provide
proof of “common answers” as to injury, plaintiffs must prove a common
injury. Accordingly, this “overlap” between the predominance requirement and the merits permits courts to review the merits without running
afoul of Eisen.178 In New Motor Vehicles, for example, the court held that
the district court must test the plaintiffs’ “novel and complex” theory of
common impact, both to satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) and to avoid “a doubtful class certification” that puts undue
pressure on the defendants to settle.179 Similarly, in Oscar, the court concluded that proof of loss causation was both “central to the certification
decision,” as well as necessary given the “in terrorem power of certification.”180
In some cases the overlap between the “predominance” requirement
and the merits leads to overreaching. In Oscar, for example, the insistence on proof of loss causation to support a finding of predominance is
unwarranted for at least two reasons. First, proof of loss causation is
175. Id. at 179.
176. Id. at 168.
177. Id. at 177; see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 100 (discussing Eisen and acknowledging that “Rule 23 does not require proponents of class certification to satisfy a preliminary injunction-like standard cast in terms of the likelihood of
success on the merits”).
178. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 33–34 (2d Cir.
2006) (concluding that requiring proof of classwide injury in a securities fraud class action does not violate Eisen because such proof is required to satisfy the predominance
requirement); see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 100 (noting, and
approving, trend by courts to “make a ‘definite assessment’ that the [class action] requirements have been met, even if that assessment entails the resolution of conflicting
proof and happens to overlap with an issue—even a critical one—on the merits”).
179. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8, 28 (1st Cir.
2008).
180. Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267
(5th Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179
(2011).
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common to the class. Either the fraud affected the share price or it did
not. Second, and more importantly, proof of loss causation is unrelated to
proof of transaction causation, because proof of any price change caused
by the fraud (as opposed to other causes) does not necessarily imply
proof of reliance by each investor. Indeed, the Supreme Court focused on
this reason in reversing Oscar.181 In fact, insofar as the fraud-on-themarket presumption establishes loss causation by permitting an inference
that any fraud in an efficient market would affect the price, insisting on
proof of loss causation would “requir[e] the plaintiffs to prove . . . the
very facts that are to be presumed.”182
More generally, the extraordinary remedy fallacy, like the all-at-once
fallacy, is itself flawed because it takes a mistaken view of the function
of the class action. As discussed earlier, the class action can be understood as a trust device that assigns dispositive control over the plaintiffs’
claims, plus an interest in any potential net recovery, to the class attorney.183 In doing so, the class action allows the class attorney to spread the
costs of investments in common issues among all of the plaintiffs.184
Moreover, the class attorney will have an incentive to invest in common
issues because he or she will have a partial interest in the plaintiffs’ total
net recovery.
But why go through the ordeal of certifying a class action to economize on common investments? It may turn out that, from the plaintiffs’
perspective, the costs of litigation simply fail to justify the litigation,
even when they are spread across the entire class.185 Admittedly, much
has been said about increasing access to justice, particularly in light of
other developments in civil procedure doctrine.186 In small claims litiga-

181. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186, overruling Oscar, 487 F.3d 261 (noting that
proof of loss causation “has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively through the fraud-on-themarket theory”).
182. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 140 (criticizing Oscar on these grounds).
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. Campos, supra note 27, at 1077–79; see also Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 27, at 395.
185. For an extreme example, see Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos., 92 F.3d 506, 508, 512
(7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a state-court class action settlement in which a class member
received $2.19 but was assessed a fee of $91.33).
186. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010) (criticizing a “restrictive ethos” among courts in
which rules pertaining to pleading, case management, and the class action, among others,
are “being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of
claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court”).
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tion, however, the stakes for an individual plaintiff do not seem to justify
the extraordinary measures needed for the class action. In fact, most
small claims plaintiffs never bother to collect whatever the class attorney
happens to recover.187
The trust function of the class action makes more sense once one considers the defendant’s incentives to invest in common issues. Unlike the
plaintiffs, the defendant owns all of the expected liability associated with
any common issue.188 Thus, the defendant does not need a class action to
aggregate the stakes and spread the costs of investments in common issues. It follows that, in the absence of a class action, the defendant will
invest more in common issues than the plaintiffs because the defendant
has more at stake.
Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot voluntarily match the stakes of the defendant, such as through joinder or informal aggregation, because of collective action problems caused by market limitations, transaction costs,
and strategic behavior.189 Put another way, legal limits on selling a claim,
the costs of coordinating the plaintiffs’ common investments, and the
potential for free-riding and hold-outs, make it impossible for the plaintiffs to match the stakes of the defendant, at least voluntarily.
Consequently, the class action is utilized in small claims litigation because of the asymmetry of stakes.190 The class action, in effect, equalizes
the stakes between the plaintiffs and the defendant by incentivizing the
class attorney to invest in common issues as if he or she had the entire
amount at stake. It does so to correct the bias in favor of the defendant in
the litigation. Otherwise, the defendant in small claims litigation can escape significant liability because of its advantage in investing in common
issues. Thus, even if the plaintiffs are indifferent to recovering in a small
claims class action, the class action at least prevents the defendant from
enjoying the fruits of its illegality.191
187. See Gilles, supra note 112, at 315 (noting that “[i]nvariably, in small-claims consumer class actions, less than twenty percent or so of class action damages funds are distributed to plaintiff claimants” (citing Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 120
(2007)).
188. This expected liability is the flipside of the expected recovery for the plaintiffs.
See Campos, supra note 27, at 1074–76.
189. See id. at 1079–81.
190. See id. (discussing the asymmetry). Cf. ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 246–48 (2003) (discussing the problem of “asymmetric stakes” in the
context of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel).
191. This concern with preventing the defendant from escaping its liability has an obvious deterrence function, which I will discuss in more detail later when I discuss the
defendant’s ex-ante conduct. See infra Part II.C.

2012]

PROOF OF CLASSWIDE INJURY

785

Admittedly, the class action increases the leverage of the plaintiffs, but
the whole point of the class action is to do precisely that. In the absence
of the class action, the defendant has an inherent advantage in leverage
that can allow it to avoid some or all of the liability associated with any
common issue. As noted by Richard Nagareda, even if the class action
increases the plaintiffs’ leverage and increases the settlement pressure on
the defendant, it does not necessarily mean that this increase is unjustified.192 This is particularly so when the claims are small and the alternative to a class action is no litigation at all. In fact, ensuring the parties
negotiate on a level playing field is necessary to prevent the class attorney from selling out the plaintiffs’ interests by accepting a too-low,
“sweetheart” settlement with the defendant.193
Accordingly, a merits determination prior to class certification defeats
the purpose of the class action. The class action is designed to permit the
plaintiffs to invest in the merits on equal terms with the defendant. Thus,
a class action only works if it is available before a court decides the merits, not after. As put by Judge Torruella’s dissent in New Motor Vehicles:
In this case, an inquiry that tests each stage of the plaintiffs’ theory is,
in effect, an assessment of the case’s merits. As such, we are putting
the cart before the horse and turning the class certification stage into a
motion for summary judgment proceeding—the appropriate juncture at
which to fully vet the viability of the plaintiffs’ theory.194

In fact, in putting the cart before the horse by examining the merits before class certification, courts are allowing defendants to escape some or
all of their liability.
C. The Individualist Fallacy
The all-at-once fallacy presumes that the class action requires an all-atonce determination of all issues. But the all-at-once fallacy relies on a
further premise. It presumes that separate actions are required to resolve
issues that are specific to each individual plaintiff. Thus, if the fact of
injury cannot be proven on a classwide basis, then it must be determined
separately for each plaintiff. This further premise is what I call the individualist fallacy.

192. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 43–48 (2007).
193. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 160, at 1379–82 (discussing sweetheart settlements
and the need for a mandatory class action to curtail them).
194. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 32 (1st Cir.
2008) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The individualist fallacy is motivated by the need to prevent uninjured
plaintiffs from recovering.195 In Neurontin, which is discussed earlier, the
district court denied class certification of a class allegedly harmed by the
fraudulent marketing of the drug Neurontin as a pain reliever.196 The
court was persuaded by the evidence of the plaintiffs’ expert, which
showed the aggregate damages caused by the fraudulent marketing
scheme.197 However, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed
procedure for distributing the damages.198 The court recognized that a
“fluid recovery” or “cy pres” process, in which the aggregate amount of
damages is assessed and then later distributed to the class, can be permissible in a class action even if the procedure does not guarantee “absolute
precision.”199 According to the court, however, a “fluid recovery” procedure cannot “circumvent the bedrock principle that members of a class
must be identifiable.”200 Thus, the proposed procedure was fatally flawed
because it “failed to articulate a method of identifying any members of
the consumer class.”201
Like the previous fallacies, the individualist fallacy appears to be a
matter of common sense. Shouldn’t individual issues be determined in
individual trials? Why should uninjured plaintiffs recover? But like the
previous fallacies, the individualist fallacy is mistaken. This is so for
three reasons.
1. Accuracy
First, the individualist fallacy is mistaken because individual trials are
not necessarily more accurate than common, all-at-once trials in determining whether each plaintiff was injured. As an initial matter, the individual evidence of injury may be unreliable. Eyewitness testimony, for
example, is notoriously unreliable—memories fade, individuals often
color past events when recalling them, and the plaintiffs are far from disinterested parties.202 Moreover, given the low monetary amounts at stake
195. Gilles, supra note 112, at 310 (discussing, and criticizing, courts’ “[u]neasiness
with disunity—with the possibility of compensating uninjured parties”).
196. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2007);
see also supra Part I (discussing Neurontin).
197. Id. at 111 (“Based on this preliminary record, I conclude that [the] proposed
methodology is a plausible way of determining aggregate class-wide liability.”).
198. Id. at 111–13.
199. Id. at 112 (quoting 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 10:5).
200. Id. at 113.
201. Id. (emphasis in original).
202. This point has been made extensively in the criminal context. See Suzannah B.
Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 196–202 (2006); see also State v. Hender-
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in small claims litigation, it is unlikely that any individual plaintiff would
preserve relevant evidence.203
More importantly, individual trials are not necessarily more accurate
than common ones because the evidence of each plaintiff’s injury may
not be unique to each plaintiff. As argued above, the difficulty in proving
classwide injury arises from counterfactual uncertainty.204 The plaintiffs
cannot prove that every plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s alleged
conduct because there is uncertainty as to whether some of the plaintiffs
were in the same position or better off in the absence of the alleged legal
violation. If the plaintiffs could identify which plaintiffs were, in fact, not
injured, they would simply exclude them from the class. Thus, proving
classwide injury requires evidence of the counterfactual that would
demonstrate which specific plaintiffs were, in fact, injured.
If establishing classwide injury turns on proof of the counterfactual, it
may turn out that evidence of the counterfactual may be common to
some or all of the class members. In Klay, for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it did not “strain credulity to conclude” that each of
the plaintiff doctors relied on the HMOs’ representations that the plaintiffs would be paid in accordance with the terms of their contracts.205 In
so concluding, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its judgment and experience
as to how a doctor would behave in negotiating contracts with HMOs,
both with and without the fraud.206 In contrast, the Second Circuit could
not provide the same benefit of the doubt to the smokers that comprised
the class in McLaughlin. There, the court could imagine some smokers in
the class who would have smoked light cigarettes even in the absence of
the fraud. Indeed, the district court in McLaughlin acknowledged that
possibility as well.207 But the larger point is that the evidence of the

son, 27 A.3d 872, 894–922 (N.J. 2011) (overruling, in a criminal case, previous rule on
eyewitness testimony based on recent research on the unreliability of such testimony).
203. Gilles, supra note 112, at 316 (noting that in small claims consumer class actions
“[n]o one keeps the receipt for a pineapple”).
204. See supra Part I.
205. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
206. Greiner, supra note 70, at 560 (noting that “[t]he trier of fact in individual cases
uses the evidence presented at trial and its own understanding of how the world works to
fill in the missing potential outcome and, subject to other relevant legal principles, decides the case accordingly”).
207. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting that “the amount of economic damages it suffered appears to be quite
weak—and plaintiffs have been less than candid in failing to acknowledge that deficiency
in their proof”).
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counterfactual may point in the direction of similarity (reliance by doctors) rather than dissimilarity (reliance by smokers).
In fact, individual actions utilize common evidence all the time. In individual mass tort actions, for example, plaintiffs often prove injury by
analogizing to other cases, in effect importing the counterfactual from
one case to another.208 Indeed, a classwide proceeding could improve
upon the use of common evidence in individual actions by using statistical techniques to avoid any biases.209
2. Avoiding Compensating Uninjured Plaintiffs
As noted above, the individualist fallacy demands accurate measures of
injury for each individual plaintiff to prevent uninjured plaintiffs from
recovering. But the individualist fallacy is further mistaken because there
is, in fact, no “bedrock principle” prohibiting uninjured plaintiffs from
recovering.210
Consider, for example, the fraud-on-the-market presumption in securities fraud litigation.211 The Supreme Court first blessed the presumption
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,212 a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant “made three public statements denying that it was engaged in
merger negotiations,” but nevertheless announced a merger about three
months after those statements.213 The plaintiffs were shareholders who
sold their stock in the period between the statements denying the merger
talks and the announcement of the merger, when the price of the stock
was “artificially depressed.”214 To recover, the plaintiffs were required to
prove their reliance on the fraudulent misstatements in selling their
shares.215 Nevertheless, the district court certified the class by permitting
208. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 967 (1993) (noting that “[i]n
mass litigation, the likely amount that one plaintiff will receive for a claim depends upon
the values of other claims”).
209. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial By Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571,
612–18 (2012) (arguing for the use of statistical methods in aggregate proceedings to
avoid outcome bias among plaintiffs); see also Greiner, supra note 70, at 534 (discussing
“potential outcomes” approach that seeks to approximate a randomized experiment to
produce strong inferences with respect to issues of fact in civil rights cases).
210. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2007)
(identifying the “bedrock principle” of preventing uninjured plaintiffs from recovering).
211. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247–48 (1988) (discussing the presumption); see also supra Part II.B (same).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 227–28.
214. Id. at 228.
215. Id. at 243.
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the plaintiffs to presume reliance based on the fact that the shares were
traded on an efficient market.
The Supreme Court found no error in establishing such a fraud-on-themarket presumption. The Court stated that
[t]he fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business . . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements.216

The Court further noted that the defendants could rebut the presumption
but suggested that any such showing should occur at trial.217
Admittedly, the fraud-on-the-market presumption only presumes
classwide reliance, not “economic loss.”218 However, once the presumption has been established, courts have further presumed injury, since “the
price at which the stock is traded is presumably affected by the fraudulent information, thus injuring every investor who trades in the security.”219
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the availability of the fraudon-the-market presumption.220 Few courts, however, have extended the
use of such a presumption beyond the securities context. In McLaughlin,
for example, the court went to great lengths to disavow the use of a
fraud-on-the-market presumption for the plaintiffs’ civil RICO fraud

216. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
For support of the “fraud on the market theory,” the Court noted that then “[r]ecent empirical studies” concerning the efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”) “have
tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on welldeveloped markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations,” although it disclaimed from adopting the efficient capital market
hypothesis (at least in its strong form) completely. Id. at 246, 246 n.24; see also Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 (1991) (discussing ECMH).
217. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248.
218. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (noting that “reliance” and “economic loss” are two separate elements of a securities fraud claim); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2001)
(vacating certification of securities fraud class action where classwide reliance was presumed, but economic loss could not be established through common proof).
219. Newton, 259 F.3d at 179 (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1419 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)).
220. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).
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claims.221 The court stressed that “Basic involved an efficient market”
while “the market for consumer goods . . . is anything but efficient.”222
But despite its name, the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not actually establish classwide reliance, at least not in the sense understood in
cases such as McLaughlin. Instead, it only shows that the fraudulent
statements would cause a change in the price of the security.223 Accordingly, the only reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market presumption is the plaintiffs’ “reliance on the integrity of th[e] price.”224 Neither
courts nor scholars pretend that such reliance is a presumption “that all
investors actually read, heard, or were otherwise aware of the alleged
misrepresentation.”225 An investor can get a tip from his uncle, rely on
the “integrity of the price,” and recover without having any knowledge of
the misrepresentation. In McLaughlin, a lack of classwide proof of such
knowledge was fatal to class certification. In Basic, this lack of
knowledge was irrelevant.226
221. In fact, the Second Circuit accused the plaintiffs of “invok[ing] the fraud-on-themarket presumption set forth in Basic” when the plaintiffs explicitly represented that they
“are not advocating the same ‘fraud-on-the-market’ presumption applicable in a securities
case.” McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 224, 224 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008).
222. Id. at 224.
223. In fact, if the fraud-on-the-market presumption establishes anything, it demonstrates “loss causation,” or “a causal connection between the material misrepresentation
and the loss.” Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. Even then, the fraud-on-the-market presumption
does not conclusively establish loss causation since it only establishes that an efficient
market would have been sensitive to the fraud. The presumption does not show that any
price adjustment was in fact caused by the fraud as opposed to other causes. Cf. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2168 (noting that fraud-on-the-market presumption should not be confused with a showing that a “misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the market
price also caused a subsequent economic loss.”).
224. Basic v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
225. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 158 (noting that the fraud on the market presumption does not presume
actual reliance by the plaintiffs); Stark Trading v. Falconbridge Ltd., 552 F.3d 568, 572
(7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.) (“[A] fraud affects the price of a publicly traded security [because] investors will be affected even if they trade without knowledge of the misrepresentations that influenced the price at which they traded.”) (emphasis added); Merritt B. Fox,
After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 839 (2006)
(noting that “[f]raud-on-the-market actions are distinctly different from actions based on
traditional reliance,” since they do not require a plaintiff “to show that she would have
acted differently but for the wrongful misstatement”).
226. In fact, the Basic court came close to eliminating the reliance requirement altogether. Langevoort, supra note 225, at 162, 162 n.45 (noting that Justice Brennan pushed
Justice Blackmun to adopt a position “in which all persons trading at a distorted price
were entitled to the presumption, and found little reason to create grounds for rebuttal”).
Moreover, early articulations of the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not invoke
reliance at all. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906–07 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
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A similar presumption is employed in antitrust price-fixing cases,
where plaintiffs allege that competitors conspired to fix the price of a
good above the competitive price.227 As in cases that permit the fraud-onthe-market presumption, courts have permitted plaintiffs to presume
classwide injury in price-fixing cases because “an illegal price-fixing
scheme presumptively damages all purchasers of a price-fixed product in
an affected market.”228 In fact, a court is permitted to calculate damages
for each plaintiff based simply on the “overcharge”—the difference between the inflated price and “what prices would have been without the
unlawful conduct.”229
The price-fixing context seems to avoid the counterfactual uncertainty
found in cases like New Motor Vehicles because the shift in the “baseline” of the price—from the competitive price to the fixed price—is the
same for every class member. Accordingly, courts have consistently refused to use such “baseline” damages where, as in New Motor Vehicles,
the parties have the option to negotiate or contract around prices to avoid
any loss.230 Courts have refused to presume impact even in price-fixing
cases where the “baseline” price is not the same for the entire class, suggesting that such variation reintroduces the counterfactual uncertainty
traditional price-fixing cases avoid.231

“proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish
a 10b-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open market,” requiring instead only “proof of purchase and the materiality of the misrepresentations”).
227. Horizontal price-fixing among competitors is per se illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940) (“[P]ricefixing combinations . . . are illegal per se; they are not evaluated in terms of their purpose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called competitive evils.”).
228. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179 n.21
(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493,
526 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); see also In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 230
F.R.D. 61, 93 (D. Mass. 2005) (accepting plaintiffs’ argument that “it may be assumed in
[price-fixing] cases that by preventing competition in a typical market defendants have
raised prices to all purchasers”).
229. 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 105, § 18:53 (noting that this method
can be used to determine “classwide damages” in price-fixing cases).
230. Pharm. Indus., 230 F.R.D. at 94 (rejecting a “baseline-impact” method for determining damages for civil RICO claims given that “the PBM, wholesale, and pharmacy
markets for the procurement of prescription drugs are highly-competitive; therefore, unlike in a price fixing conspiracy, ‘payors can leverage this competition to dissipate the
effects of the alleged AWP scheme’”).
231. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 325–26 (3d Cir.
2008) (vacating class certification where court erroneously presumed antitrust impact in
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But looks are deceiving. Suppose that a plaintiff would have bought a
widget for $10 a unit, the fixed spot price for the widget is $9 a unit, and
the competitive spot price is $8 a unit. Further suppose that given his
willingness to pay,232 the plaintiff would have negotiated a contract with
the seller to buy the widget for $10 a unit, and would have negotiated
such a contract in both the actual world and the counterfactual world because he is a poor negotiator.
If the plaintiff did, in fact, enter into a $10 contract, would he have
been injured if the spot price had been $8 in the counterfactual world and
$9 in the actual one? According to the New Motor Vehicles court, the
answer is no, since the plaintiff would pay a $10 price in both worlds.233
But what if the plaintiff had the same willingness to pay but simply
bought at the spot price? In both contexts the buyer faces the risk that the
spot price may be less or more than his willingness to pay. If he chooses
to assume the risk and only pay the spot price, he can recover. However,
if he chooses to avoid the risk and lock in his preferred price ex ante
through a contract, then he cannot.
The only relevant difference between the contract context and the spot
price context is that the contract context allows the plaintiff to memorialize his ex ante preferences. In the spot price context, by contrast, the
plaintiff can have the same ex ante preferences but simply stay quiet
about having them in the first place.234 In essence, the baseline method of

price-fixing case, because the evidence suggested that some plaintiffs paid divergent
prices, and some even paid lower prices, during the class period).
232. Admittedly, introducing the concept of “willingness to pay” raises the possibility
of endowment effects, where an individual’s “willingness to pay” and “willingness to
accept” the same good may depend on whether the individual already has the good or is
acquiring it. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63–68 (1994). While I acknowledge the effect, it is independent of the basic point I am making here, that a more refined focus on a plaintiff’s exante preferences may reveal that he or she is not injured.
233. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 29 (1st Cir.
2008) (noting that poor negotiators may not have been injured since they may have paid
the same price in both worlds).
234. Indeed, the same method of ignoring the ex-ante preferences of the plaintiff arises
in the securities context, where most plaintiffs are effectively purchasing securities at
spot prices. Because we seldom have accurate evidence about investors’ willingness-topay, we permit recovery for an overcharge caused by fraud even if the investor would
have paid for the security at the artificially inflated price, or sold at the artificially depressed price, despite the fraud. I thank David Rosenberg for clarifying my thinking on
the possibility that ex-ante expectations may vary among the class, leading to situations
in which some plaintiffs are not, in fact, injured.
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proving classwide injury avoids counterfactual uncertainty by ignoring
any uncertainty in each plaintiff’s ex ante preferences.235
As shown above, the use of presumptions and baselines in the securities and antitrust contexts may permit uninjured plaintiffs to recover. Because of presumptions and baselines, plaintiffs in securities fraud cases
may recover without necessarily relying on the fraud, and plaintiffs in
price-fixing cases may recover even if they would have paid the same
price in the absence of the price-fixing conspiracy.
Although the use of presumptions and baselines in securities and antitrust litigation permit courts greater “flexib[ility]” in processing securities and antitrust claims, they are not necessarily intended to operate in
other substantive areas.236 According to Nagareda, courts permit the use
of economic and statistical theories to support presumptions and baselines only in contexts where “economics is one with legal doctrine,” such

235. The ignorance of ex ante expectations becomes clear when one considers the
possibility of price discrimination in the counterfactual world. Imagine, for example, a
market in which the price is fixed at $6, the competitive average price would be $5, but a
seller in a competitive market could engage in some price discrimination. Under this
scenario, a plaintiff could pay $9 (his willingness-to-pay) in the competitive world, but
only $6 in the actual world. I thank Fred McChesney for clarifying my thinking on these
points. Cf. MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES IN ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 6–7, 7 n.5
(2008) (asking “should a merger of competitors that creates a perfectly discriminating
monopolist that leads to a small increase in productive efficiency be allowed? While such
a merger raises aggregate surplus it will also make consumers who are not shareholders
worse off”). Admittedly, perfect price discrimination is impossible in a perfectly competitive market, and in most cases is otherwise illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (prohibiting, with some exceptions, “any person engaged in
commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality”). But some amount of price discrimination occurs in sufficiently
competitive markets, such as markets that provide student discounts.
236. See Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 172 (arguing in favor of a
context-specific approach since “[a] securities fraud claim is different from an employment discrimination claim. Each, in turn, differs from an antitrust or RICO claim”). But
see Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1654 (1999) (suggesting that the use of different standards and presumptions for proving reliance in some contexts but not others is a reflection of “ongoing
uncertainty as to the true state of substantive law,” and suggesting that the same standards
should apply transubstantively). These doctrines could be justified by a preference by
Congress to vigorously enforce antitrust and securities fraud law, but the Congressional
preference for vigorous enforcement of at least the securities laws has been cast in doubt
by the passage of statutes in the late 1990s to limit the use of class actions for securities
fraud claims. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105353, 112 Stat. 3227–28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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as securities fraud and antitrust litigation.237 Indeed, other features of antitrust and securities law, particularly the direct purchaser rule, which
explicitly permits noninjured parties to recover,238 suggest that the procedures that apply in antitrust and securities litigation are unique to those
contexts.239
But these economic and statistical doctrines are not, in fact, limited to
certain substantive areas. The difficulty of proving classwide injury can
be understood as a problem of inferential reasoning—to what extent can
a court infer causation when it cannot directly compare the actual with
the counterfactual. Indeed, recent developments in statistics have returned to the common sense notion of “but-for causation with a special
focus on time.”240 Since the problem of proving facts through inferential,
or circumstantial, evidence is as old as the law itself, one can view the
fraud-on-the-market presumption or the use of baseline damages in
price-fixing cases as variations on common legal techniques for dealing
with counterfactual uncertainty.
For example, the fraud-on-the-market presumption is analogous to presumptions of reliance used for common law fraud claims, which, similar
to securities fraud claims, are based on “entitlement[s] to rely on representations of fact by strangers whether or not there is any reason to trust
them, because doing so facilitates economic exchange.”241 Likewise, the
use in the antitrust context of “baseline” damages as a “just and reasonable” inference of damage is no more different than the doctrines used to
establish “general” damages that are the “foreseeable” and “natural consequences” of the legal violation.242 Indeed, the use of reasonable infer237. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 106–07 (noting that in the antitrust and securities context, “economics is one with legal doctrine,” and thus competing
expert testimony “ultimately convey competing accounts of law,” while in the civil RICO
and employment discrimination context “the integration of legal doctrine and social science is still a tentative, contested enterprise”).
238. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492–94 (1968)
(rejecting “passing on” defense for purposes of challenging standing); Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729–36 (1977) (holding that only direct purchasers have standing
to sue for violations of the federal antitrust laws).
239. But see Gilles, supra note 112 (arguing that the direct purchaser rule and the
availability of punitive damages argues against requiring a showing of ascertainability of
the plaintiffs).
240. Greiner, supra note 70, at 537 (discussing the recent “potential outcomes” statistical approach to establishing causation, which focuses on but-for causation over time).
241. Langevoort, supra note 225, at 161 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (7th ed. 2007)).
242. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 cmt. e, Special Note (1932) (defining “general” damages as those that are “foreseeable” and the “natural consequence” of
the breach); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 904 (1939) (same).
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ences is at work in a case like Klay, where the court permitted a finding
of common proof of reliance since it “d[id] not strain credulity” that each
of the doctors relied on the representations of the HMOs.243
The ignorance of a plaintiff’s ex ante expectations, which is crucial to
the operation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and the use of
baseline damages in antitrust law, is pervasive. Consider a modern, runof-the-mill personal injury case. Suppose that a plaintiff purchases a car
with a defective accelerator244 and sues to recover from the manufacturer
for any design or manufacturing defect.245 If one takes a New Motor Vehicles approach to the issue of injury, one would focus on the ex ante
expectations of the plaintiff in purchasing the car. Would the plaintiff
have purchased the car for the same price had he or she known of the
defect? Or would the plaintiff have negotiated a lower price in the but-for
world because of the risk created by the defect? If so, what would the
plaintiff have been willing to pay for a defect-free car (assuming, of
course, some modicum of negotiating skill)? Isn’t the real injury the imposition of an additional risk that the plaintiff would not have accepted in
the counterfactual world at the price he or she paid?
In tort litigation involving personal injuries, U.S. courts explicitly reject such “loss of value” claims246 and typically ignore the “expectancies” of the plaintiff altogether.247 Instead, courts presume that, in the
243. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
244. E.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices,
& Prods. Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1381–82 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (ordering transfer
of actions concerning alleged “sudden, unintended acceleration” defect in Toyota cars for
consolidation in the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)).
245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998) (providing for liability for design
defects, manufacturing defects, and failures to warn).
246. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tire Products Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012,
1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting claims of breach of implied warranty due
to defect in tire, noting that “most states would not entertain the sort of theory that plaintiffs press”).
247. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK ET AL., MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 50 (4th ed. 2010)
(“The conventional wisdom is that expectancy damages are recoverable only in contract,
not in tort.”). There are exceptions, most notably in the fraud context. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977) (“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business transaction is also entitled to recover additional damages sufficient
to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these damages are proved with
reasonable certainty.”). This exception in the fraud context, especially carved out for
“business transaction[s],” makes it odd that the McLaughlin Court expressed skepticism
over whether “expectancies” like the benefit of the bargain are recoverable in the civil
RICO context. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 228 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting, without deciding, that “benefit of the bargain” damages “are generally unavailable in
RICO suits,” relying upon the “business or property” language of the civil RICO statute);
see also Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1063–65 (E.D.N.Y.
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absence of the negligence, the plaintiff would not have accepted the ex
ante risk associated with a defective product. Furthermore, we provide,
in effect, tort insurance for any actualized harm, rather than compensate
for the cost of bearing the additional risk.248 Thus, one could imagine
situations where the plaintiff is not injured because he would have assumed the same risk of harm in the absence of the tort. Ignoring the
plaintiff’s ex ante preferences to avoid counterfactual uncertainty is not
limited to exceptional doctrines like the fraud-on-the-market presumption and the baseline damages awarded in price-fixing cases. As demonstrated by the hypothetical above, it is an everyday feature of tort law.
3. Deterrence
Third, the individualist fallacy is mistaken given the commonality of
the conduct that gives rise to the litigation and the deterrence function of
the litigation. Courts and scholars insist on proof of classwide injury in
part because they consider it necessary to prove a common legal violation. The Court in Wal-Mart illustrates this view. There, the Court concluded that, without proof of classwide injury, the plaintiffs failed to
provide “convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and
promotion policy,” and thereby failed to “establish[] the existence of any
common question.”249 Likewise, Nagareda has argued that the use of
“aggregate proof” of classwide injury is circular, since it presumes
“some doctrine in governing law that unites all class members as victims
of the same wrong.”250
But the existence of a common wrong does not require common proof
of injury. Instead, the commonality of the wrong stems from the defendant’s ex ante conduct, which, in all of the above cases, is common to the
class. In these cases, the defendant necessarily treats the population affected by its conduct as an undifferentiated whole because the defendant
cannot know who will be affected by its actions prior to committing a
legal violation.
2005) (Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215 (concluding that “benefit
of the bargain” damages are available in civil RICO claims involving fraud).
248. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1017, 1017 n.1 (rejecting “loss of value”
claims for defective tires, noting that “[i]f tort law fully compensates those who are physically injured, then any recoveries by those whose products function properly mean excess compensation,” and showing that recovery for loss of value and recovery for actualized harm add up to the same amount).
249. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
250. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 129; see also id. at 101 (defining
“aggregate proof” as proof “that presumes a view of the proposed class in the aggregate”).
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This can be difficult to conceptualize,251 so consider the disparate
treatment claim in Wal-Mart. There, the plaintiffs alleged that WalMart’s hiring and promotion practices contained excessive subjectivity,
which, combined with its uniform corporate culture, permitted an inference that Wal-Mart discriminated against women.252 The plaintiffs alleged a “disparate treatment pattern-or-practice” claim under Title VII,
which requires a showing of discriminatory conduct that “is repeated,
routine, or of a generalized nature” rather than “sporadic discriminatory
acts.”253 The conduct at issue in Wal-Mart, however, appears to be sporadic acts of discrimination, since it involved the thousands of discrete
pay and promotion decisions made by Wal-Mart’s store, district, and regional managers.254
But suppose, for example, that Wal-Mart adopted the practice described above, but is deciding whether to add a checklist that store managers must use in making pay and promotion decisions. The checklist is
designed to avoid biases based on gender and thus would decrease WalMart’s Title VII expected liability. Wal-Mart, of course, cannot predict
the checklist’s future effects on specific female employees, but it can
estimate its effects over the affected female employee population. In fact,
Wal-Mart may intentionally refuse to adopt a checklist given its animus
towards its female employees.
The Title VII claim in Wal-Mart is, in essence, that Wal-Mart intentionally decided not to impose measures like a checklist to reduce any
gender disparities.255 That allegedly discriminatory decision would be
common to the class, even though the effects of that decision were not.256
Moreover, the claim in Wal-Mart does not presuppose any novel theories

251. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs “have little in common but their
sex and this lawsuit.”), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541; see also Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557
(quoting Judge Kozinski’s dissent with approval). I briefly discuss the common violation
in Wal-Mart in Campos, supra note 27, at 1070–71, although I discuss it in more detail
here.
252. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
253. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 336 n.16 (1977)
(defining disparate treatment pattern-or-practice claims as claims that concern conduct
that “is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature,” where plaintiffs must prove “more
than sporadic acts of discrimination”).
254. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146–47 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
255. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
256. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 600–12 (concluding that the plaintiffs’ evidence “provide[s]
sufficient support to raise the common question whether Wal-Mart’s female employees
nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate policies” which violated Title VII)
(emphasis in original).
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of Title VII liability. It is no more circular than alleging a legal violation
that you intend to prove later. The claim simply alleged “discriminate[ion] in the old-school, intentional sense,” albeit on a much larger
scale.257 In fact, in Falcon, the Court previously conceded that plaintiffs
could bring a Title VII class action “if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such
as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”258
The same can be said of a number of legal wrongs that are common to
the class but involve differentiated conduct. One example is the fraudulent mass marketing campaign in McLaughlin, which relied on retailers
selling cigarettes to individual consumers. Another is the alleged horizontal anticompetitive conspiracy in New Motor Vehicles, which relied
on dealerships negotiating car prices with buyers.
The commonality of the defendant’s ex ante conduct is crucial to understanding why accuracy as to each individual’s injury is unnecessary to
fulfill the deterrence function of the litigation. In general, liability rules
deter misconduct because the defendants seek to avoid or reduce their
expected liability.259 For example, in New Motor Vehicles, the litigation
would deter the defendants only if the prospect of any liability would
have affected their decision to engage in the conspiracy in the first place.
In this way the litigation affects the defendant’s ex ante decision making
even though the litigation occurs after the violation.
If the deterrence function arises from the effect of the expected litigation on the defendant’s ex ante conduct, then accurate proof of each
plaintiff’s individual injury is unnecessary. All that is needed is an accurate assessment of the aggregate liability caused by the defendant’s conduct because the defendant will only consider its aggregate expected liability in deciding how to act. The defendant cannot base its actions on a
more fine-grained determination of the effects of its conduct on individual plaintiffs because in cases like New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin, a
defendant cannot know ex ante how its classwide conduct will specifically affect each potential plaintiff.
257. Nagareda, Class Certification, supra note 19, at 155. That is why Richard Nagareda is incorrect in concluding that the claim in Wal-Mart is only that Wal-Mart “enable[d] discrimination.” Id. at 153. Rather, the plaintiffs took great pains to allege that the
Wal-Mart itself engaged in intentional discrimination. Nagareda further criticizes the
proof of such discrimination, calling it “startlingly inept,” id. at 155, but that is a merits
inquiry as to whether there was a wrong at all. Inept proof of a common wrong does not
transform a common wrong into an individual one.
258. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
259. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing the
deterrence function of liability rules); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (same).
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Moreover, determining the defendant’s aggregate liability does not depend on an accurate determination of each plaintiff’s injury. In theory,
the individual injuries of each plaintiff could be summed up to provide
an assessment of the aggregate damages. But, as noted above, an assessment of damages at the individual level may lead to significant error as
well as significant underreporting, which can bias the result. More importantly, many statistical methods, most notably the use of random
sampling, can approximate the aggregate amount of damages with far
greater accuracy than the summing up of individual injuries.260 In fact,
the district court in McLaughlin mentioned the benefits of random sampling in approving a procedure for determining aggregate damages.261
Admittedly, the deterrence function of the liability does not obviate the
need to determine each individual’s damages. But the deterrence function
of the litigation does show that the determination of individual injury and
damage is of secondary importance, such that it should not be a relevant
factor in determining class certification. The failure to certify a class in
small claims cases like New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin would result in the suboptimal imposition of aggregate liability on the defendant.
Again, that is because the class action corrects for the asymmetric stakes
between the plaintiffs and the defendant. These asymmetric stakes lead
to the defendant investing more in common issues, which ultimately result in the skewing of the defendant’s ex ante aggregate liability in its
favor.262 In fact, given that in small claims litigation no individual plaintiff would bring suit, the absence of a class action means that a defendant
avoids its ex ante expected liability altogether.263
Accordingly, the failure to certify a class in cases like New Motor Vehicles and McLaughlin would not only lead to no recovery for the plaintiffs, but permit the defendants to commit the same legal violations with
260. In fact, the McLaughlin court’s conclusion that an inaccurate determination of
individual damages would taint a classwide determination of damages suffers from a
fallacy of composition. By envisioning instances in which the plaintiffs would not recover, they assume that the group as a whole would be reflective of those examples. But one
cannot infer population-based statistics like aggregate loss from individual statistics like
individual injury, at least not in the absence of procedures like random sampling to avoid
biases. See Greiner, supra note 70, at 563 (noting that “[r]andom assignment assures that,
in the absence of bad luck, units who receive one treatment are not systematically different from those who receive the other treatment”).
261. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1244–46 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d
Cir. 2008).
262. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the problem of asymmetric stakes).
263. See, e.g., David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and
“Indivisible Remedies,” 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 546, 562 (2011).
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impunity. The relevant trade-off is not between the deterrence provided
by the class action and the accuracy provided by the individual trial. The
trade-off is between optimal deterrence and imperfect compensation versus no deterrence and compensation at all.
I want to conclude by emphasizing the private interest the plaintiffs
have in deterrence. Many scholars have correctly noted the public interest in the enforcement of the law provided by deterrence.264 But the
plaintiffs themselves have an interest in preventing the unlawful violation from occurring and would have personally benefitted from a class
action rule that, among other things, did not require a showing of classwide injury. Such a rule would have likely deterred the defendant from
committing the wrong in the first place.
The litigation admittedly occurs after the legal violation has occurred,
when nothing can be done about it. Unfortunately, we never address the
effect of the class action rule when the defendant is considering its conduct ex ante, as we do with injunctions or other ex ante enforcement
mechanisms. Instead, we have a vicious cycle of ignoring the deterrent
effect of procedure, imposing suboptimal liability, causing more legal
violations, ignoring the deterrent effect of the procedure, and so on.
To break this vicious cycle, courts should consider the counterfactual
of the effect of the class action on the defendant’s ex ante conduct.265
Accordingly, we need to not only consider the compensatory interests of
the plaintiffs after the legal violation has occurred, but also the ex ante
effects of the procedure before the violation, since it is the type of consideration that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”266 Indeed,
this counterfactual, ex ante inquiry is of paramount importance because
most, if not all, plaintiffs would prefer to avoid the unlawful conduct
than to suffer it and receive compensation, no matter how accurate the
compensation would be.
III. AGAINST COMMON ANSWERS
It follows from the above that I am against requiring proof of “common answers” as to each plaintiff’s injury to certify a class action. The
requirement of proof of common injury arises, in part, from a trend by
circuit courts to require proof of each of the requirements of Rule 23 by a
“preponderance of the evidence,” even if such proof would overlap with

264. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 112, at 309; Rubenstein, supra note 123, at 723–28.
265. I argue for such an inquiry in more detail in Campos, supra note 27, at 1104–10.
266. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (citing cases discussing this mootness
exception).
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the merits.267 The trend is largely justified because many of the class certification requirements of Rule 23 require factual findings by the court,
particularly the “preponderance” requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).268 As put
by Judge Easterbrook, “[t]he proposition that a district judge must accept
all of the complaint’s allegations when deciding whether to certify a
class cannot be found in Rule 23 and has nothing to recommend it.”269
Nevertheless, both the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) merely require a finding
of common “questions,” not common answers, and for such a finding the
pleadings are more than sufficient.270 The class action prevents the defendant from using its greater stakes to invest more on common issues
than the plaintiffs. Thus, a class action should be certified once common
issues are present to allow the plaintiffs to invest in these issues on a level playing field, regardless of whether all issues are amenable to common
resolution. Requiring more to certify a class, particularly a showing of
likelihood of success on the merits, would frustrate the function of the
class action and the substantive areas of the law that utilize it.271

267. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Easterbrook, J.); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006);
Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th
Cir. 2007), overruled by Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179
(2011).
268. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring a finding by the court that “the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”); Id. 23(a)(4) (requiring a finding
by the court that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class”); Id. 23(b)(3)(requiring that “the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy”) (emphasis added).
269. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675.
270. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring only a “find[ing] that the questions of law
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”) (emphasis added); Id. 23(a)(2) (requiring only that “there are questions of
law or fact common to the class”) (emphasis added).
271. If there is a factual showing that a court should scrutinize, it is the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), which requires a court to find that “the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Id. 23(a)(1). Current law sets the bar for
numerosity as low as forty. Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a suit as a class action, but
generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.”). However, a higher numerosity
threshold, perhaps in the thousands, would ensure that the stakes are so asymmetric that
class treatment is more than justified, as well as cut down on the costs associated with
class certification. This is not to say that courts should require precise proof of numerosi-
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I am also against common answers in another importance sense. The
class action has garnered interest from other jurisdictions as a supplement to law enforcement, particularly the use of class actions for the type
of small claim, consumer litigation discussed above. For example, the
European Union has proposed the increased use of class actions to enforce conduct in violation of its anti-competition and consumer protection laws.272 Mexico has also recently passed a statute that allows for
class action procedures to “help consumers challenge companies that
overcharge for goods and services and that fail to meet quality standards.”273 Class action procedures have also been proposed or utilized in
Asia.274
In discussing the class action, this Article recognizes that the collective
procedures adopted or proposed in other countries may differ in material
ways. It also recognizes that the legal and social context of the United
States also differs from other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, in adopting, designing, or implementing a class action
procedure courts should consider at least three factors, which roughly
track the three fallacies discussed above. These factors are by no means
exhaustive. However, they are important because the fallacies that lead to
doctrines such as the requirement of proof of classwide injury may unduly influence other jurisdictions. If anything, the goal of this Article is to
ensure that other jurisdictions learn from the United States’ mistakes.
First, and as shown by the all-at-once fallacy, the primary function of
the class action in the United States is not to realize savings in adjudicating claims all-at-once. Instead, the function of the class action is to correct what can be called a Coasean problem in U.S. law.275 Because the
private entitlement to bring a cause of action is initially assigned to each
ty along the lines of listing identifiable plaintiffs, as that would replicate the problem of
classwide injury all over again.
272. Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 141, 142 (2010) (discussing the use of class actions in the European Union,
noting that “[w]ithin Europe, consensus is emerging that competition law requires private
enforcement if it is to be collective.”).
273. See Nathan Koppel, Class Actions Head South of the Border, WALL ST. J. LAW
BLOG (Sept. 2, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/09/02/class-actionshead-south-of-the-border/ (discussing an article in “Mexico’s Official Gazette” about the
new class action procedure adopted by Mexico).
274. E.g., Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1998); Dae
Hwan Chung, Note, Introduction to South Korea’s New Securities-Related Class Action,
30 J. CORP. L. 165 (2005).
275. See Coase, supra note 56, at 2–15 (setting forth Coase theorem). I have similarly
argued that the problem is functionally analogous to a “tragedy of the commons.” See
Campos, supra note 27, at 1085–87.
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individual victim to recover his or her own damages, it can result in
asymmetric stakes situations when a defendant engages in common conduct that injures a large number of dispersed victims. The class action is
needed in the United States because it allows the plaintiffs in these situations to avoid easily predictable collective action problems, which otherwise would allow the defendant to escape some or all of its liability.
Accordingly, the utility of a class action in other jurisdictions will depend on the extent to which the assignment of causes of action leads to
the type of collective action problems that arise in the United States. For
example, one feature of U.S. law that leads to collective action problems
is restrictions on the selling of claims under the law of champerty and
maintenance. In essence, a victim can sell a claim only if the claim has
accrued, and even then, only to the defendant through a settlement.276 But
if a jurisdiction allows for greater freedom in the selling of claims, then
plaintiffs may not be as disadvantaged relative to the defendant. Although the defendant, again, owns a monopoly in the defense of its liability, plaintiffs may be able to sell their claims to an entity277 or, perhaps,
to an insurer via subrogation,278 thereby substantially lessening any
asymmetric stakes between the parties.
Moreover, the class action arises in the United States because of gaps
in public enforcement. Thus, a jurisdiction considering the use of the
class action must also consider how to coordinate such private enforcement with public enforcement. In many cases the use of private enforcement and public enforcement may be complementary, such as the use of
private rights of action to supplement ex ante regulation.279
In other cases, however, public and private enforcement may be at
cross-purposes. Somewhat ironically, in the securities fraud and antitrust
contexts in the United States, public enforcement through liability is inevitably followed by private actions, leading to significant overdeter-

276. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 107–20 (2011)
(discussing, and criticizing, the law of champerty and maintenance).
277. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 320–23 (2011)
(discussing the adoption of measures in such countries as the Netherlands in permitting
“third-party funding” of litigation, which functionally allows third parties to own equity
interests in claims).
278. For one such proposal, see Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited
Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take
Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261 (2007). Indeed, given the proliferation of governmentfinanced health care systems, one could imagine the government suing to recoup the costs
of treating the victims of a tort.
279. SHAVELL, supra note 259, at 279–84.
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rence.280 In these contexts the “title” to bring and dispose of claims can
be understood as a license granted by the government to enforce. Understood in this way, the class action is a type of “qui tam” or “bounty
hunter” procedure that assigns the license (plus an interest in any sanction) to an uninjured party.281 Consequently, the issue for any policy
maker is whether a private license to enforce can peacefully coexist with
a public enforcer. This is not to say that ex post liability actions by both
public enforcers and private enforcers are substitutes for each other. Instead, a jurisdiction has to be careful in designing both private and public
enforcement to take advantage of their comparative advantages.282
Second, and as suggested by the extraordinary remedy fallacy, jurisdictions should not flinch given the size of the class or the amount of the
liability at stake. The impulse to engage in a “likelihood of success” inquiry when the liability is large is understandable, particularly when
class certification could result in the bankruptcy of the defendant. But it
is important to recognize that the liability itself is not a function of the
class action. Instead, it is a function of mass production, since many of
the cases discussed, particularly the Wal-Mart case, arise from activities
taken by the defendant at a very large scale. To limit liability based on
the scale of the conduct at issue would effectively provide one strategic
technique a company can use to avoid liability, similar to judgment
proofing or using subordinates to commit wrongdoing. There may be
reasons to limit the liability of large-scale activities, but the sheer magnitude of the liability should not be one of them, particularly when the liability could equally arise from many defendants instead of one.
Third, and as suggested by the individualist fallacy, jurisdictions
should not lose sight of the objectives of the litigation. In the United
States, courts and scholars have been preoccupied with protecting both
the plaintiffs’ rights in their causes of action and the defendant’s defense
rights.283 But in the United States, and presumably elsewhere, the func280. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 266–86 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing overdeterrence caused by “follow on” suits in antitrust law).
281. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 35–42 (2009) (discussing, but criticizing,
the delegation of enforcement power to private parties like class attorneys who are not
otherwise victims).
282. For one such proposal, see David Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating
Private Class Action and Public Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 159 (2006).
283. See, e.g., Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation across the Atlantic, supra note 5, at 10–
11 (arguing that one of key issues in any aggregate litigation is “who is to be precluded
thereby?”); see also Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (noting due
process and Rules Enabling Act concerns with proposal to have mandatory class action
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tion of private rights of action is to deter potential defendants from committing legal violations in the first place.284 It makes little sense to restrict
class actions out of a respect for the litigation rights of the parties when
they would undermine the purpose of those rights. Consequently, courts
should not deny a class action out of a concern for accuracy as to individual injury. Not only is such accuracy unnecessary, but, as shown in
the cases above, it would lead to the very legal violations for which the
plaintiffs seek compensation.
CONCLUSION
One cause of the requirement of proof of classwide injury is the reluctance of courts to utilize exceptional procedures like the class action.
Although the American litigation model is itself exceptional, the class
action is even more so because it is the great exception to the “principle
of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.”285 This reluctance is, in turn, a reflection of the humility of U.S.
courts, which recognize that other institutions may be better equipped to
handle the policy considerations that underlie the class action. Such humility has its virtues, but not in all cases. The class action is itself “‘an
invention of equity . . . mothered by the practical necessity’ of providing
a practical procedure to enable large numbers of litigants to enforce their
common rights.”286 After all, and as noted by Judge Weinstein in the
McLaughlin litigation, it is also a principle of general application in U.S.
law that “every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every
injury its proper redress.”287

with sampling of claims, since it would undermine the litigation rights of the plaintiffs
and the defendant).
284. Indeed, it is the essential function of all liability rules. See Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, & Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090–92 (1972).
285. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877)).
286. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1023 (1973) (Hays, J., dissenting)
(denial of rehearing en banc), aff’d, 417 U.S. 167 (1974) (quoting Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948)).
287. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1020 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(Weinstein, J.), overruled by McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).

